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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 16, 1995, the Clinton Administration threatened to
impose $5.9 billion in punitive tariffs on thirteen Japanese luxury
car models, the largest U.S. tariff ever contemplated against any
trading partner.' This hardball approach illustrates that although
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1 See David E. Sanger, 100% Tariffs Set on 13 Top Models o/Japanese Cars,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at Al. In threatening punitive tariffs on Japanese
automobiles, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor "insist[ed] that the
United States is within its rights to act unilaterally against Japanese imports."
Id. at D4. One bank estimated that the cost of U.S. sanctions against Japanese
automobiles would total $17.5 billion, more than three times the original
estimate. See Mark Felsenthal & Toshio Aritake, U.S. 'Softens' on Auto Talks
Date; Meeting Likely Before June 15 Summit, [Jan.-June] Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 106, at A-16, A-17 (June 2, 1995).
The automobile dispute eventually settled in the eleventh hour, but only
after "American negotiators abandoned key demands." William Drozdiak, U.S.,
Japan Reach Trade Deal, Averting Sanctions, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at Al;
see also David E. Sanger, U.S. Settles Trade Dispute, Averting Billions in Tariffs
on Japanese Luxury Autos, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at Al (detailing the
events relating to the U.S.-Japanese settlement). Although the Clinton
Administration "threatened Tokyo with the biggest U.S. sanctions ever and
generat[ed] an international uproar," the trade disagreement followed a familiar
pattern: "Washington makes blustery threats and Tokyo grudgingly responds
at the last minute with modest concessions that make the Japanese market
marginally more open to imports." Paul Blustein, A Bitter Fight Produces Little
Real Cbange, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at Al. President Clinton cited the
agreement as "'a great victory for the American people' because it would
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nations often pursue peaceful exchange through negotiation and
consultation, intense trade disputes will often emerge. Not
surprisingly, when trade controversies surface between trading
partners, nations respond to protect the economic interests of
their citizenry. The crucial question is not whether nations will
react, but rather how nations will react to and resolve trade
disputes. In the current era of globalized trade and economic
interdependence, sovereign states must grapple with a fundamental
question: whether to utilize unilateral, self-help mechanisms or
multilateral, international fora to resolve inevitable trade confron-
tations.
In the United States, Congress occasionally delegates its foreign
commerce power2 to the Executive Branch.3 For example, in the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 4 Congress
bolster exports to Japan by U.S. automakers and create thousands of new jobs."
Drozdiak, supra, at A32. Japanese trade minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
countered:
[t]he figures Clinton announced . .. for increases in the number of
dealerships selling U.S.-made autos, in the number of U.S.-made auto
parts to be imported to Japan and in the number of autos produced at
the Japanese manufacturers' U.S. production sites - ultimately were
nothing more than U.S. estimates, and were not legally binding ....
Blustein, supra, at A32. For a detailed explanation of the issues and settlement
of the automobile dispute, see discussion infra section 4.
2 Congress shall have the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3. The Executive Branch has no
sgeCific authority to regulate foreign trade other than what Congress explicitlyelegates to it.
3 Congress frequently delegates broad authority to the President to enter
into international agreements because it realizes the difficulty of 535 individuals
negotiating an agreement. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY A.
ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 25 (1994).
Such broad delegation of authority to the President began in 1934, when
Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act giving the President"general tariff-setting authority." Id. This broad delegation of trade negotiating
authority continued until the mid-1970s when Congress began to reassert its
power over foreign commerce. See David E. Birenbaum, The Omnibus Trade
Act of 1988: Trade Law Dialectics, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 653, 655-57 (1988)
(discussing the struggle between Congress and the President for primacy over
trade policy).
4 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418,
1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164-68 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2411)
[hereinafter 1988 Act].
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sharpened "section 301"' and authorized the United States Trade
Representative ("USTR")6 to retaliate unilaterally against any
"unjustifiable," "unreasonable[,] or discriminatory"8 "act, policy,
or practice of a foreign country."9 Section 301 thus is the classic
embodiment of unilateralism; a self-help mechanism allowing a
nation to assert its rights as a sovereign actor within the interna-
tional system. In stark contrast to unilateral trade measures,
sovereign states also enter into multilateral international agree-
ments to capture comparative advantages and maximize the
general international welfare.1" For example, the World Trade
The original S 301 was passed as part of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, S 301, 88 Stat. 2290, 2364-66 (1974). Congress passed amendments
to S 301 as part of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
S 901, 93 Stat. 144, 295-96 (1979), and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-573, S 301, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000 (1984). After Congress altered,
amended, and scattered the S 301 provisions throughout 19 U.S.C. S 2411-
2420, the title "section 301" disappeared from the official United States Code
altogether. Common trade parlance, however, still refers to this retaliation
provision as S 301. This Comment will refer to the retaliation provisions
embodied in 19 U.S.C. S 2411-2420 as 5 301 provisions. For an analysis of
S 301, and its history, application, and effect, see discussion infra section 2.
6 The USTR's authority in this context is "subject to the specific direction,
if any, of the President." 19 U.S.C. S 2411 (a)(1) (1988). Therefore, the
President retains the ultimate authority over retaliation, even though the USTR
possesses decision making power.
7 19 U.S.C. S 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii). See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
s 19 U.S.C. S 2411(b)(1). See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
9 19 U.S.C. S 2411(a)(1)(B).
10 The notion of comparative advantage is based on the neoclassical
economic theory of international trade. Under this theory:
[t]he market mechanism dictates that each nation produce the goods
and services which it can produce most efficiently, considering quality
and cost. Maximum aggregate production is achieved and all products
are at their minimal cost. Under a free system, the world's standard
of living is higher than if international trade is nonexistent, restrained,
or distorted.
Marjorie A. Minkler, Note, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Section 301: A
Permissible Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States'
Obligations Under International Law?, 11 J. L. & COM. 283, 285 (1992); see also
MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: A POLICY AP-
PROACH 183-90 (1971) (discussing how international trade maximizes the
general welfare); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND TAXATION 81-82 (1969) (setting forth the original theory of comparative
advantage).
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Organization ("WTO"),n  and its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),12 seek to liberalize
trade13 in a multilateral context. Should a contracting party
14
" GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,1994, reprinted in 33 .L.M.
1125, 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Pinal Act]. After "more than seven years of
arduous and often bitter bargaining, ministers from 109 countries signed a far-
reaching trade liberalization agreement" which created the WTO as the
successor to the GATT. Alan Riding, 109 Nations Sign Trade Agreement: Seven
Years of Struggle to Reduce Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1994, at 35. Emerging
from the Uruguay Round accords, the eighth and most ambitious round of
GATT trade agreements since World War II, the WTO joins "the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the main watchdogs of the global
economy." Id. at 48. The WTO commenced operation on January 1, 1995.
See David E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at 14. For a comprehensive discussion of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, the formation of the WTO, and the creation of
the WTO "legalist" dispute resolution process, see infra section 3.
1 The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT]. Although the WTO supplants the GATT as the
foremost "watchdog" of world trade, the GATT still exists as a provisional
trade agreement with its authority grounded in the President's treaty making
powers. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional
Reform in the New GA TT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 479 (1994). For a discussion
of the history of the GATT and its dispute resolution process, see infra section
3.
13 The Preamble to the GATT clearly contemplates trade liberalization by
stating that all trade relations "should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living.... developing the full use of the resources of the world
and expanding the production and exchange of goods .... " GATT, supra note
12, pmbl., 61 Stat. at All, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194. Furthermore, the GATT is
dedicated "to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers .... "
Id. 61 Stat. at A7, 55 U.N.T.S. at 188; see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 8-17 (1989) (detailing the assumptions of the international economic
system) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; .Tycho H.E.
Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for Sidestepping the
GA77, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 413-15 (1994) (summarizing the goals and
benefits of liberalized trade).
Two primary vehicles for trade liberalization under the GATT and the
WTO are the "most favored nation" ("MFN") and "national treatment"
principles. MFN treatment dictates that "any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncondition-
ally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties." GATT, supra note 12, art. I, 61 Stat. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 196. National treatment as set forth in the GATT requires, for example,
that "[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be exempt from internal taxes and
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"nullify or impair""5 the trade rights of another nation bound
under a WTO agreement, a neutral dispute resolution process
ensues. 6 Sovereign nations join the WTO to reap the benefits
of international trade and to maximize global wealth.17 With 111
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied ... to like
products of nationalorigin." Id. art. ml, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 204.
14 The term "contracting parties" in the GATT refers to all sovereign states
that have acceded to the GATT agreements. Originally, 23 sovereign nations
acceded to the basic agreement in 1947. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RE-
STRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 5 (1990) (detailing the history and
development of the GATT membership) [hereinafter JACKSON, RESTRUCTUR-
ING GATT].
" See GATT, supra note 12, art. XXXII, 61 Stat. at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at
266. The original GATT agreement states:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to
it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired ... as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting
party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the
application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the
existence of any other situation ....
Id.
16 The predecessor to the WTO dispute resolution process was the GATT
multilateral dispute resolution process. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
The GATT process evolved from Articles XXII and XXIII of the original
GATT Agreement and later was codified and approved in 1979. See infra notes
116-117 and accompanying text. In 1993, the creation of the WTO set forth
an entirely new dispute resolution process, one based on a legalist model. See
infra notes 100, 133, & 136-37 and accompanying text. The dispute resolution
provisions of the Uruguay Round are included in the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1226-44 [hereinafter Understanding]. For a detailed ac-
count of the evolution of the GATT dispute resolution process into the WTO
model, see discussion infra section 3.
17 Described as "truly momentous" by Vice President Al Gore, the
agreement creating the WTO - totalling 22,000 pages and weighing 385 pounds
- is expected to reduce import tariffs by 40% and increase global income by
$235 billion per year. See Riding, supra note 11, at 35, 48. The Clinton
Administration estimates that "[w]hen fully implemented the Uruguay Round
Agreements will add $100-$200 billion to the U.S. economy each year[,] create
hundreds of thousands of new, well-paying American jobs[, and] provide for a
reduction in worldwide tariffs of $744 billion, the largest global tax cut in
history." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF
AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1994) [hereinafter MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT].
The GATT contributed "to the biggest increase in prosperity that the West
had ever known." Panel, Can the GA 7T Resolve International Trade Disputes?,
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executing members,"8 the WTO exists as a noble paradigm of
multilateralism; a model series of trade pacts that both delineates
substantive trade agreements and establishes an international
forum for dispute resolution.
Because the unilateral domestic actions of any nation necessari-
ly impact the rights and obligations of the multilateral internation-
al system, a fundamental tension exists between the theories of
realism and of free trade. Realism views sovereign states as
autonomous entities maintaining the need to act as independent
nations in pursuit of self-defined interests. 9 Free trade theory,
however, holds that sovereign states are components of an
overarching international system requiring cooperation, coordina-
tion, and mutual trust in order to deliver the recognized benefits
of liberalized trade.' Thus, the free trade-realist tension crystal-
lizes as such: only by acting as a unified whole can the interna-
tional system maximize global welfare, but only by acting autono-
mously can a nation assert and maintain its need and desire for
true sovereignty. In this respect, the notions of sovereignty and
global trade are mutually exclusive forces dividing national
77 AM SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287, 287 (1983) (quoting Sir Roy Denman, Head
of Delegation for the Commission of the European Communities). Specifically,
the GATT successfully slashed tariffs, removed many quantitative restrictions
to trade, and eliminated a host of nontariff barriers. See Gardner Patterson &
Eliza Patterson, The Road from GA TT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35,
39-40 (1994) (discussing the GATT's success in liberalizing trade).
" Although GATT membership stood at 125 upon completion of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, only 109 nations executed the agreement creating
the WTO on April 15, 1994. See Riding, supra note 11, at 48. For a list of the
112 nations admitted to the WTO, as well as the 27 nations on the "waiting
list," including Russia and China, see Knock, Knock, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996,
at 72.
19 The foreign relations theory of realism suggests that all states are
"autonomous, self-interested, and animated by the single-minded pursuit of
power." G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 855 (1995)
(discussing the general background against which all trade legalism has devel-
oped). Realism dominates international relations theory and is an important
influence in contemporary political science and rhetoric. Id. at 855-56; see also
Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485, 485 (1988) (arguing that
realism presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international
cooperation).
20 Proponents of free trade theory use the concept of comparative
advantage to trumpet the benefits of liberalized trade. For a concise explana-
tion of free trade theory, see Shell, supra note 19, at 854-55.
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/9
ADJUDICATING SECTION 301
pursuits. Moreover, as a result of economic interdependence,
there is "an ever increasing domain for international law and a
constantly shrinking sphere for autonomous government ac-
tion."21  Although sovereign nations will grapple with this
uncomfortable conclusion, the trade-off is worthwhile - a world
of truly liberalized trade where every nation's citizens reap the
benefits of global production and consumption, thereby improving
the collective quality of life.
Section 301 and the WTO dispute resolution process respec-
tively epitomize the unilateral and the multilateral responses to
economic disputes in an interdependent world. Section 2 of this
Comment summarizes the history and application of section 301.
Section 3 explores the evolution of the WTO dispute settlement
process from a "pragmatic model" to a "legalist model" of dispute
resolution. Section 4 details the recent and notorious use of
section 301 in escalating the U.S.-Japanese automobile dispute.
Section 5 ventures beyond the automobile dispute settlement and
analyzes how the Japanese and the United States would have
hypothetically litigated the case before the WTO. Finally, section
6 explores how the WTO should have ruled on a Japanese
challenge to the use of section 301 sanctions in the automobile
dispute. This Comment concludes that as the domain of
multilateralism overtakes the shrinking sphere of unilateralism, the
WTO should strongly rebuke any use of unilateral sanctions by
a GATT signatory, including the United States' use of section 301
in the automobile dispute. The manner in which the WTO
judges approach this task of adjudication is not merely a theoreti-
cal exercise, for "as global trade accelerates, billions of dollars and
thousands of jobs may hang on the way this discussion
evolves."2
21 Victoria C. Price, New Institutional Developments in GA 77, 1 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 87, 109 (1992) (describing the need for an international
economic order) (emphasis added).
2 Shell, supra note 19, at 834.
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2. THE UNILATERAL PARADIGM: SECTION 301
2.1. Purposes, Origins, and History of Section 301
2.1.1. Objective of Section 301
The broad objective behind section 301 is straightforward: to
"pry open foreign markets and thus further liberalize trade."23
Section 301 seeks to open foreign markets for U.S. goods, services,
and investment opportunities through a credible threat of
retaliation.2 4 In common economic parlance, section 301 is a
"stick that, in combination with the carrot of an open U.S.
market," can liberalize trade and reduce foreign tariff and
nontariff barriers.26 While the United States uses section 301 in
conjunction with other trade statutes protecting domestic
industries,' it remains "the sole trade remedy aimed principally
at facilitating U.S. export of goods and services .... ."' Because
2 Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge
of the International Trading System?, 23 INT'L LAW. 523, 527 (1989) (discussing
how the United States never viewed retaliation as the objective of S 301)
[hereinafter Holmer & Bello, Savior or Scourge]. Alan F. Holmer served as
Deputy USTR and Judith H. Bello served as Acting General Counsel at the
Ofice of the USTR under the second Reagan Administration.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Nontariff barriers ("NTB"s) are nonmonetary practices that restrict
market access. NTBs, "as the name suggests, are easier to define by what they
are not than what they are." Andrzej Olechowski, Nontariff Barriers to Trade,
in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 121, 121 (J. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
NTBs constitute the single most important obstacle to the growth of
international trade. See id. Examples of NTBs include: quota restrictions,
licensing requirements, absence of uniform international standards, state-
sanctioned monopolies, certification restrictions, and limits on the repatriation
of profits. See Stahl, supra note 13, at 419-20, 443-45. Many of the new
challenges surrounding trade policy involve combating these nonmonetary
barriers to trade. See id.
2" The most commonly used trade tools to protect domestic industries are
antidumping laws and countervailing duty provisions. For an example of an
antidumping law, see 15 U.S.C. § 71-77P(1988)0 (repealed 1994). For an
example of a countervailing duties liw, see 19 U.S.C. 1 1303 (1988).
28 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 Recent Developments and
Proposed Amendments, 35 FED. B. NEWS & J. 68, 68 (1988) (describing 5 301
and illustrating some of its recent uses) [hereinafter Bello & Holmer, Recent
Developments].
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of this ability to promote U.S. exports, section 301 truly functions
as a unique weapon in the United States' trade arsenal.29
2.1.2. History of Section 301: A Series of Amendments
The history of section 301 is as complicated as the objective of
section 301 is straightforward. The legislative path to the most
recently adopted section 301 began with Congress' passage of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 ("1962 Act").3 Historians recog-
nize section 252(c) of the 1962 Act as the "immediate predeces-
sor"31 to section 301 because it provided the President with the
authority to impose tariff or import restrictions upon those
nations obstructing U.S. trade in violation of an international
agreement.3 2 Twelve years later, Congress repealed section 252
of the 1962 Act and replaced it with section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, a bolder, more specific provision.3 Disturbed by the
29 See K. Blake Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:
Its Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81
NW. U. L. REv. 492, 493. (1987) (noting § 301's unique ability to promote U.S.
exports and to break down foreign trade barriers).
30 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, S 252, 76 Stat. 872,
879-80 (1962) (repealed 1974) [hereinafter 1962 Act]. For the legislative history
surrounding the passage of the 1962 Act, see S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3110.
A few scholars claim that the history of § 301 dates back more than 200
years to the 1794 congressional act that gave President Washington the
statutory authority to restrict imports from foreign nations that he determined
were discriminating against U.S. exports. See Thatcher, supra note 29, at 495
(citing to 1 Stat. 372 (1794)). The 1934 amendments to the 1930 Tariff Act
later provided authority "quite analogous to that granted by section 301." Bart
S. Fisher & Ralph G. Steinhardt, III, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974-
Protection for U.S. Exporters of Goods, Services and Capital, 14 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 569, 573-74 (1982) (tracing § 301's lineage to the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 and the Trade Agreements Act of 1934). Because S 252 of the 1962
Act is recognized as not merely analogous to, but rather the predecessor of
301, this historical account begins at that point.
3' Thatcher, supra note 29, at 495.
32 The 1962 Act primarily targeted "unjustifiable" agricultural barriers,
although the Act provided limited authority to retaliate against nonagricultural
barriers. See BAYARD & ELIOTT, supra note 3, at 24, 26. The United States
used § 252 only twice: to retaliate against EEC levies on poultry imports and
to challenge Canadian export restrictions on U.S. cattle and meat. See id. at 26;
see also Julia C. Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and
Suggested Strategies for Foreign Response, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501, 504-
05(1989) (describing the 1962 Act) [hereinafter Bliss, Suggested Strategies].
11 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, repealed by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, S 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-43 (1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
19961
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"time-consuming and politically oriented GATT decision-making
process,"34 Congress authorized the President in section 301 to
institute retaliatory action against foreign practices that are
"unjustifiable or unreasonable and which burden or restrict [U.S.]
comerce."35  By passing the new provision strengthening the
President's authority, Congress "initiated the trend toward
unilateral action in disregard of international rules."36
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 ("1979 Act")37 modified
section 301 in at least four ways. These amendments: (1) clarified
the President's authority to enforce U.S. rights under any
applicable trade agreement;3 (2) imposed time limits on section
301 investigations;39 (3) required the Special Trade Representa-
tive4 to consult immediately with any foreign government
accused of an unfair trade practice;41 and (4) authorized the
acceptance of private petitions.42 Similarly, the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 ("1984 Act")43 amended section 301 in an additional
2411-2420 (1988)).
34 Kenneth J. Ashman, Note, The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 - The Section 301 Amendments: Insignificant Changes from Prior Law?,
7 B.U. INT'L Lj. 115, 120 (1989) (discussing HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS REP. ON THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1973)).
3s Trade Act of 1974, § 301(a)(2), 88 Stat. at 2041 (codified as amended at
S 19 U.S.C. S 2411 (1988)). Between January 1975 and December 1979, the
President issued a determination in only one S 301 case. See, e.g., BAYARD &
ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 27.
36 Bliss, Suggested Strategies, supra note 32, at 505.
37 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 901, 93 Stat. at 144, 295 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. % 2411-2416 (1988)). For the legislative history
surrounding the 1979 amendments to S 301, see S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23442 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 620-28. For a
summary of the 1979 amendments, see BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at
27.
31 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 93 Stat. at 296 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2411(a)(1)).
39 See id. at 297.
40 The Special Trade Representative was the predecessor to the USTR. The
1988 amendments to S 301 vastly expanded the USTR's responsibilities. See
infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
41 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 93 Stat. at 297 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2413).
42 See id. (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2412(b)).
43 See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 301-307, 98
Stat. 2948, 3000-13 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.). For the legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1984 Act,
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four ways. The 1984 Act: (1) defined the previously ambiguous
terms "unjustifiable,"44  "unreasonable,"45  and "discriminato-
ry;"46 (2) mandated the showing of an injury in conjunction with
the unfair trade practice; 47 (3) loosened the deadline by which the
USTR must initiate consultations with a foreign government
accused of an unfair trade practice;41 and (4) authorized the
USTR to initiate investigations without waiting for a private
petition or a presidential order.49 In addition to substantively
see S. REP. NO. 308, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-51 (1983).
44 An "unjustifiable" trade practice is defined as "any act, policy, or practice
which is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of
the United States." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, sec. 304, S 301(e)(4), 98 Stat.
at 3005 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2411 (d)(4)(A) (1988)). Unjustifiable
practices "include, but are not limited to" the denial of GATT MFN rights,
GATT national treatment, the right of enterprise establishment, and the
protection of intellectual property rights. 19 U.S.C. S 2411(d)(4) B).
Essentially, an unjustifiable act includes any violation of an existing trade
agreement or the denial of an expected benefit based on an international legal
norm. These unjustifiable acts by foreign nations are, under the 1988
amendments to S 301, grounds for mandatory USTR retaliation. See discussion
infra section 2.2.1.
48 An "unreasonable" trade practice is defined as "any act, policy, or
practice which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the
international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be unfair
and inequitable." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, sec. 304, S 301(3) (3), 98 Stat.
at 3005 (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. S 2411(d)(3) (1988)). These
unreasonable trade practices are, under the 1988 amendments to S 301, grounds
for discretionary USTR retaliation. See discussion infra section 2.2.2.
46 A "discriminatory" trade practice is defined as "any act, policy, or
practice which denies national or _N treatment to [U.S.] goods, services, or
investment." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, sec. 304, § 301(e)(5), 98 Stat. at
3006 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2411(d)(5) (1988)). These discrimina-
tory practices are, under the 1988 amendments to § 301, grounds for
discretionary USTR retaliation. See discussion infra section 2.2.2.
47 Under this "injury" test, the petitioner must show that the unfair trading
practice "burdens or restricts [U.S.] commerce." Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
sec. 304 a, S 301(a)(1)(B)(ii), 98 Stat. at 3003 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§2411(a)(1)B)(ii) (1988). This injury test is considered "more lenient than
those found in other U.S. trade laws . . . ." Ashman, supra note 34, at 127.
4' This amendment allowed the USTR to delay his request to consult with
the accused government for up to 90 days. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
sec. 304(e), S 303(b), 98 Stat. at 3005 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
2413(b)M(1)(A) (1988)).
49 See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, sec. 304(d)(1), 5 302(c), 98 Stat. at 3004
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2412(b) (1988)). By authorizing the USTR
to initiate investigations without prompting, Congress hoped the President
would more aggressively prosecute cases. See BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note
3, at 27-28.
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altering the section 301 process, the 1984 Act required the USTR
to prepare an annual National Trade Estimate ("NTE") highlight-
ing significant barriers to U.S. trade and investment."
Congress passed yet another series of major amendments in the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ("1988 Act"). 1
Unlike prior amendments to section 301 that only slightly
modified existing practices, the 1988 Act significantly altered
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, sec. 30a), § 181, 98 Stat. at 3001-02
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2241 (1988)).
"' See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, S 1301, 102 Stat.
at 1107 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. S 2411 1988)). Conceived in 1985,
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act numbered more than 1,000 pages
in length, was assigned to 17 separate subcommittees, and "may have been the
largest, most complicated legislative effort undertaken." Alan F. Holmer &
Judith H. Bello, The Promise and Peril of Unilateralism, in TRADE LAW AND
POLICY INSTITUTE, at 187, 187-95 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 510, 1989) [hereinafter Holmer & Bello, Promise and Peril]. This
Act covers diverse areas such as trade negotiating authority, a harmonized
system of tariff nomenclature, and provisions for trade adjustment assistance,
as well as the § 301 amendments. See Ashman, supra note 34, at 129. For the
legislative history surrounding the passage of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, see H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1987),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547.
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section 301 in several respects. 2  Among other changes, 3 the
1988 Act: (1) created two outgrowths of section 301;"4 (2)
officially transferred authority to enforce U.S. rights to the
USTR;ss (3) defined specific "unreasonable" practices;s6 and (4)
52 While the 1988 amendments significantly altered § 301 in form, the
question many scholars have posed is whether the 1988 amendments altered its
substance and application. For a careful analysis of the 1988 amendments'
substantive effect on § 301 application, see Ashman, supra note 34, at 152-53
(arguing that the 1988 amendments to S 301 as a whole provide insignificant
change from prior law); Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, The 1988 Trade
Bill: Is It Protectionist?, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. BNA) 1347, 1347 (Oct. 5, 1988)
(concluding that the 1988 Act "continues rather than contorts traditional U.S.
trade policy . . . .") [hereinafter Holmer & Bello, Is It Protectionist?].
" The 1988 Act amended § 301 in at least nine different ways. The
amendments: (1) transferred authority from the President to the USTR; (2)
detailed denial of worker's rights, export targeting, and restrictions on market
access as "unreasonable" practices; (5) placed time limits on USTR unfairness
determinations; (4) imposed time constraints on retaliatory action once the
USTR identified an unfair practice; (5) prompted an investigation of Japanese
barriers to U.S. trade; (6) amended the NTE filed by the US to include the
value of lost commerce due to trade barriers; (7) created "Special 301," a
provision requiring the identification of nations and practices that infringe upon
intellectual property rights; (8) created "Super 301," a provision requiring the
USTR to announce and publish a list of the most egregious trade offenders and
their unfair trade practices; and (9) separated "mandatory" retaliation from "dis-
cretionary" retaliation. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
g 1301-04, 102 Stat. at 1164-82. For comprehensive commentary on each
amendment from the 1988 Act, see Ashman, supra note 34, at 130-51 and Bliss,
Suggested Strategies, supra note 32, at 512-24.
s The two outgrowths are commonly referred to as "Special 301" and
"Super 301." Special 301 provides additional protection for intellectual property
rights and is codified at 19 U.S.C. S 2242. See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan
F. Holmer, "Special 301 ". Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (1989-90) (discussing Special 301's aim to promote the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights in foreign
countries). Super 301, codified at 19 U.S.C. S 2420, requires the USTR to
identify and publish the most egregious trade offenders and practices. See
generally Elizabeth K. King, Comment, The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988: "Super
301" and Its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System Under the GA T, 12 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 245 (1991) (noting that Super 301 is used to accuse countries
of a broad range of unfair trade practices). Although, the original Super 301
provision expired in 1990, President Clinton reauthorized the provision by
executive order. See Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994). Some
commentators have labelled President Clinton's Super 301 "a kinder and gentler
[S]uper 301" because it neither requires nor encourages the labeling of-entire
countries as unfair traders. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 45. These
two outgrowths of S 301, while controversial, are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
55 See 19 U.S.C. 5 2411 (1988).
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imposed extremely rigid time constraints on the section 301
process.' The major structural change, however, was the
establishment of two distinct categories of unfair trade practices
- those prompting "mandatory" retaliation (section 301(a))5 8 and
those giving rise to "discretionary" retaliation (section 301(b)). 9
With the creation of these rigid categories, the implementation
of section 301 became a more elaborate process with substantially
restricted governmental discretion. 60 Although mandatory
section 301(a) retaliations are subject to several exceptions, 61 the
1988 Act illustrates the evolution of section 301 "from a diplomat-
ic, flexible means of solving market access problems to a more
rigid, procedural trade remedy statute."6 2  Thus, by 1988, the
56 See id. § 2411(d)(3)(B).
17 See id. S 2412, 2413.
See id. § 2411(a) (delineating S 301(a)).
s See id. S 2411(b) (delineating S 301(b)).
60 See N. David Palmeter, Section 301: The Privatization of Retaliation, 3
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 101, 103 (1990) (noting today's § 301 contains procedures
that are almost formal).
61 For the exceptions to the application of S 301, see 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)
(1988). Commentators have criticized the statutory construction of § 301. One
scholar concludes that S 301 presents "an intricate maze of mandatory
commands in one place and extremely wide loopholes in the other." Robert
E. Hudec, Thinking About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113, 122 (Tagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds.,
1990) [hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM]. He continues: "[o]ne needs
a wiring diagram to trace whether mandatory commands given in one part will
actually reach their final target without passing through at least one discretion-
ary exitpoint." Id.; see also BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 32 (describing
one Senator's description of Super 301 as "mandatory but not compulsory");
Ashman, supra note 34, at 141 (arguing that the USTR can "avoid mandatory
retaliation" whenever desired); Daniel G. Partan, Retaliation in United States
and European Community Trade Law, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 333, 334 (1990) (noting
the wide authority that the statute confers upon the USTR to avoid retaliation
in mandatory action cases).
Since the mandatory retaliation provisions appear largely illusory, this
Comment does not distinguish between the discretionary and mandatory uses
of S 301, but rather identifies them generally as "section 301" actions.
62 Bliss, Suggested Strategies, supra note 32, at 502. In comparison to many
congressional proposals, such as the infamous "Gephardt Amendment," the
1988 amendments to S 301 actually appear benign. The Gephardt Amendment,
proposed by Representative Richard Gephardt, provided for mandatory 5 301
action against any nation with "an excessive and unwarranted" trade surplus
that did not reduce this trade surplus by 10% annually. Id. at 522 n.91.
Congress eventually rejected the "Gephardt blunderbuss" in favor of Super 301
because "it was a more controlled, less scattershot policy instrument" which
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United States had fashioned its foremost unilateral "trade remedy"
in the form of section 301.
The most current form of section 301 finally emerged when
Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements in late 1994.63
These most recent section 301 amendments, found in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act ("1994 Amendments"), addressed "the
conduct of section 301 investigations and the authority of the
Trade Representative to respond to unfair trade practices by
foreign governments."64 Most notably, the 1994 amendments
explicitly reserved the ability to use section 301 to combat
problematic trade issues outside the scope of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 65  Furthermore, the 1994 amendments gave the
USTR the express right to use section 301 against "anticompetitve
practices that restrict the sale of U.S. goods or services to a foreign
market, not just to foreign firms that engage in such practices."66
By virtue of these "clarifying" amendments, Congress indicated its
intent to use the force of unilateral sanctions in situations where
a trade area or practice is outside the scope of the WTO.
67
Instead of providing the President with broad authority and
"sent a strong message about trade priorities to the [P]resident while allowing
him more latitude in implementation than [the] Gephardt [Amendment] did."
BAYARD & ELLiOTT, supra note 3, at 37.
63 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994). In a "lame duck" session and as the last act of the 103d
Congress, both the House of Representatives and the Senate approved imple-
menting legislation for the Uruguay Round trade pact with broad, bipartisan
majorities. See David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact To Ease Trade Curbs; A
Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al, A22. A joint compro-
mise creating "a mechanism to involve Congress in abandoning the agreement
if the [WTO] acts unreasonably in actions against the United States assured
passage of the implementing legislation. Id.
64 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1027. The 1994
amendments to S 301 fall into four categories: amendments to the authority
under S 301, amendments to unreasonable practices related to intellectual
property or anticompetitve practices, amendments to the protection of
intellectual properiy, and amendments to the time limits for investigations. See
id. at 1027-29.
65 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act 5 314(a)(1), 108 Stat. at 4939; see also
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1027 (noting the Clinton
Administration's intent to expand the focus of potential action under S 301).
66 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1028 (codified at
Uruguay Round Agreements Act S 314(c)(1), 108 Stat. at 4940).
67 See discussion infra section 5.2.1 for the U.S. position on its use of S 301
to combat trade practices or issues outside the "four corners" or, in other
words, outside the scope of the WTO.
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wide discretion to retaliate against foreign practices, section 301
explicitly defines unreasonable trade practices,68 reduces the
influence of wider policy considerations, 69 and forces unilateral
action.7 0  In theory, the Executive Branch no longer has com-
plete discretion to determine either the severity of an unfair trade
practice or the appropriate retaliatory response,71 but rather is
"handcuffed" by tighter procedures and deadlines.72 Prior to the
creation of the WTO, section 301 had carried the day as the
dominant U.S. response to trade disputes because it was a quick,
politically-safe reaction to an increasingly competitive economic
world. Over time, the "aggressive unilateralism"7 3 of section 301
has resonated deeply with officials in the global political arena.
68 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B) (1988).
69 Traditionally, trade policy formation has been an interagency process.
With the passage of the 1988 amendments to § 301, Congress clarified its intent
that "the delegation . . . of its [c]onstitutional power to regulate foreign
commerce in many areas is meant to be exercised by the [USTR] ... I not by
other Cabinet officers." H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1987).
Under the S 301 structure, a lower, sub-Cabinet level within the USTR's office,
rather than at the Cabinet Secretary level, will isolate, analyze, and decide
complex issues of trade policy that implicate national defense and foreign
policy. See Bliss, Suggested Strategies, supra note 32, at 514. Removing trade
policy from broader considerations, such as national defense and foreign policy,
however, may further politicize trade decisions.
70 See Bliss, Suggested Strategies, supra note 32, at 502.
71 See Ashman, supra note 34, at 130-32. One Senator characterized efforts
to amend § 301 as a way "to transform a sporadic, unpredictable, occasional,
[and] ad hoc use of [§] 301 . . . into a systematic attempt" to solve intractable
trade problems. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988
Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRES-
SIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 61, at 81.
7 Hudec, supra note 61, at 118.
73 Coined by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, the term "aggressive
unilateralism" refers to a bilateral trade negotiation situation where "unilateral
demands for liberalization are backed by threats of retaliation." BAYARD &
ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 19. In fact, aggressive unilateralism as enacted by
§ 301 denotes "a double dose of unilateraism: the United States unilaterally
determines what is unfair and then demands unilateral trade concessions to
rectify the alleged 'cheating.'" Id. In addition to S 301, other U.S. trade policy
tools embodying an aggressively unilateral approach are sections of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Department of Agriculture's Export
Enhancement Program, the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, the Buy
American Act of 1988, and the Primary Dealers Act of 1988. See id. at 22.
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2.2. Application of Section 301
2.2.1. Mandatory Action
Pursuant to both the 1988 Act and the 1994 Amendments, the
USTR must retaliate against foreign nations in three specified
situations: (1) whenever "the rights of the United States under any
trade agreement" have been denied;7 4 (2) whenever a foreign
practice "otherwise denies" likely benefits to the United States
under any trade agreement;75 and (3) whenever an "unjustifiable"
act of a foreign government "burdens or restricts" U.S. com-
merce.76 Essentially, section 301 compels domestic retaliation
when a foreign nation violates a trade agreement or when a
foreign act nullifies or impairs an expected international benefit,
such as MEN status.
2.2.2. Discretionary Action
Under section 301(b), retaliation is discretionary in response
to an "unreasonable"' or "discriminatory" 8 foreign practice
that "burdens or restricts "71 U.S. commerce.80  Whereas the
violation of a formal or informal agreement encourages mandatory
retaliation, discretionary retaliation, by definition, responds to
actions independent of any explicit or implicit international
agreement, norm, or custom. Once a section 301 petition is filed
with the USTR, however, the investigative and fact-finding
procedures are identical, regardless of whether the allegation
triggers mandatory or discretionary retaliation.81
74 19 U.S.C. S 2411(a) (1) (A) (1988)-
71 Id. 2411 (a) (1) (B) (i) .
71 Id s 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
77 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
80 19 U.S.C. S 2411(b)(1) (1988) .
"1 The investigative and factfinding process of S 301 is as follows: when
conducting either a self-initiated or a requested investigation, the USTR is
subject to a strict timeline and shall request consultations with the accused
foreign nation. Prior to determining if the complaint actually violates § 301(a)
or S 301(b), the USTR shall provide an opportunity for presentation of views
and seek advice from the International Trade Commission. Once the USTR
identifies an act subject to mandatory or discretionary retaliation, he must
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2.3. Results of Section 301
Because the "concern for reputation is not enough to induce
nations to honor their commitments,"82 proponents of
unilateralism present a strong case in support of section 301. In
theory, if section 301 regularly succeeds in prying open closed
markets, both the United States and the entire world reap the
benefits of liberalized trade and efficient allocation of resources.
8 3
Provided that opportunism 4 is disabled and the threat of sanc-
tion is credible, the use of section 301 is intuitively sensible."
Section 301 thus appears quite efficacious, both on a theoreti-
cal and empirical level. One scholar even described section 301 as
"one of the rare successes among U.S. trade statutes, uncharacteris-
tic in its commitment to opening markets rather than protecting
them." 6 For example, according to one study, section 301
yielded a trade liberalizing outcome in fifty-eight of the eighty-
three cases filed, or seventy percent of the time.17  Of the
publish the determination in the Federal Register. The USTR possesses
authority to withdraw benefits, impose duties, and restrict market access for
violating either § 301(a) or $ 301(b). The penalty, however, shall be equivalent
to the harm inflicted. Implementation of these retaliatory measures is subject
to rigid time constraints. The USTR shall monitor the situation and terminate
all penalties when they cease to be appropriate. See 19 U.S.C. % 2411-2419
(1988). See generally Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview,
in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, supra note 61, at 1, 3943 (summarizing this
301 process).
12 Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 263, 266 (1992) [hereinafter Sykes, The Limited Case].
83 See id.
4 Opportunism refers to the United States "cheating" or using the power
of § 301 for protectionist purposes - purposes other than prying open foreign
markets. See id. at 282 (discussing the dangers of opportunism when sanctions
are contemplated); see also Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory" Retaliation for Breach
of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301, 8 B.U.
INT'L Lj. 301, 321 (1990) (concluding that 5 301 rules out massive retaliation
and discourages opportunism) [hereinafter Sykes, The Strategic Design].
85 Not only does intuition support the use of § 301, but game theory
analysis also demonstrates the theoretical success of S 301, assuming the game
is one of unfixed duration and the threat of sanction is credible. For an
analysis of 5 301 based on the "Prisoner's Dilemma," see Sykes, The Strategic
Design, supra note 84, at 309-23.
86 Sykes, The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 317.
87 See id. at 309-16. For a complete list of § 301 cases-between 1975 and
1991, see id. at n.144, n.165 & Appendix. A more recent exploration of 5 301
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twenty-five remaining cases, only two, or eight percent of the
cases, were considered "clear failures," while the rest either remain
unsettled or, alternatively, were withdrawn, dismissed, or
modified. 8 In conclusion, it appears as if threat strategies have
succeeded in prying open foreign markets. Perhaps the success of
section 301 demonstrates that "might does make right" 9 in U.S.
trade policy.
2.4. International Response to Section 301
Despite its apparent success in liberalizing world trade, section
301 elicits more international condemnation than any other U.S.
trade provision. 0 According to one academic, section 301 "is
probably the most criticized piece of U.S. foreign trade legislation
since the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930."91 Sovereign states
unite in opposition to section 301 regardless of their global
economic standing.92 The European Union's enactment of a
cases appears in BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 355-465. The Bayard &
Elliott study explores 91 S 301 cases from 1975 to 1994. Bayard & Elliott
conclude that S 301 is most effective when (1) there is domestic political
support for reform in the target country and (2) the target barrier is transparent
and readily identified. See id. at 332. Thus, U.S. pressure through S 301 is far
more likely to overcome readily identified barriers, such as tariffs or quotas,
than less easily defined and more subjective barriers, such as administrative or
regulatory impediments to trade. See id. at 332-33.
See Sykes, The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 309-16.
8 Thomas 0. Bayard, Comment on Alan Sykes' "Mandatory Retaliation for
Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section
301", 8 B.U. INT'L LJ. 325, 325 (1990) (noting U.S. retaliatory threats are often
effective pin rying open foreign markets). Indeed, one scholar has called S 301
the "Arnold Schwarzenegger of U.S. trade law." Warren Maruyama, Section
301 and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394, 397 (1990)
(discussing how the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 tightened
9 301 procedures).
o See Sykes, The Strategic Design, supra note 84, at 301.
91 Hudec, supra note 61, at 113.
92 As one commentator remarked: "[w]henever you want to increase the
blood pressure of the negotiators of the Third World countries, just whisper
the word '301' in their ears and they are out of tune in no time." Thomas J.
Trendl, Self-Help in International Trade Disputes, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
32, 48 (1990) (quoting Professor Yogesh Tyagi of the School of International
Studies, Nehru University, New Delhi). Japanese commentary is equally
critical of S 301. For example, a former Japanese Ambassador stated: "to be
judge, jury and executioner at the same time is not acceptable." Holmer &
Bello, Promise and Peril, supra, note 51, at 188 (quoting Ambassador Yoshio
Hatano of Japan). For further examples of foreign criticism, see Ashman, supra
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counterpart to section 301 is possibly the most forceful example
of such opposition to this U.S. statute." While the European
Union does not utilize its counterpart with the same voracity as
the United States uses section 301, 94 the mere adoption of a
mirror statute reflects international frustration with a "totally one-
sided affair in which the United States plays both prosecutor and
judge, in which defendants are tried in absentia, and in which
Congress has ordained certain guilty verdicts in advance. . .. ""
Put simply, the international community and an ever-increas-
ing number of academics96 criticize section 301's departure from
multilateralism in favor of bilateral "initiatives based on bullying
smaller trading partners." 7 Despite its ability to liberalize trade,
section 301 is a massively unpopular market opening mechanism.
This disfavor could lead to retaliatory action by U.S. trading
partners, which, in turn, could produce a global economic
slowdown. In light of international distaste for aggressive
unilateralism, the international community designed a less
reactionary trade resolution mechanism in the WTO.
note 34, at 115 n.5 (quoting officials from Brazil, France, Korea, Japan, and
Australia). Section 301 particularly upsets the Europeans because nearly one
quarter of all S 301 action is directed at Europe. See Wolfgang W. Leirer,
Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade Law: A
Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation
2641/84, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 41, 44-45 (1994).
9' See Council Regulation 2641/84 on the Strengthening of the Common
Commercial Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit
Commercial Practices, 1984 O.J. (L 252) 1. For the differences between the
E.U. provision and § 301, see Miquel Montafi i Mora, A GATT With Teeth:
Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 133 n.128 (1993) (noting important differences
between Council Regulation 2641/84 and § 301).
14 See Montafia. i Mora, supra note 93, at 132-33. For a discussion of how
the E.U. utilizes its § 301 counterpart, see Leirer, supra note 92, at 69-89.
s Hudec, supra note 61, at 114.
96 Forty of the most prominent U.S. economists signed a statement drafted
by Professor Bhagwati that condemns S 301. See Hudec, supra note 61, at 114
n.2.
17 Id. at 114.
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3. THE MULTILATERAL PARADIGM: WTO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
3.1. GATI' Dispute Resolution or GATT Dispute Avoidance?
Described as a "unique phenomenon among the major
instruments of world order," the GATT is an institution without
true identity.98 Since its inception, commentators have described
the GATT in several ways: as a powerful supranational body
acting as a court, as a pragmatic series of multilateral trade
agreements, and even as a mere negotiating forum to facilitate
bilateral resolution.9  The Uruguay Round1"' created the
WTO,101 not as an addendum to the GATT, but rather as a
98 Price, supra note 21, at 87 (describing the organic development of the
GATT over 50 years).
9 See Can the GA TFResolve International Trade Disputes, supra note 17, at
290 (quoting Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., a Washington D.C. attorney and former
General Counsel to the USTR).
100 The Uruguay Round of negotiations was launched on September 20,
1986, in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and concluded on December 15, 1993. See
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, BISD 33rd
Supp. 19-28 (1987); The Road to Marrakeh, Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER, Dec.
1993, at 3. It was the eighth such negotiation session under the auspices of the
GATT. See Lisa S. Klaiman, Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures to
a Trade in Services Agreement: Proceed With Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 657, 658 (1990) (discussing the hopes of the contracting parties present at the
Uruguay Round. The revious Rounds were: Geneva, Switzerland (1947)
(establishing the GATT; Annency, France (1949); Torquay, Great Britain
(1950-51); Geneva (1955-56); the "Dillon Round" in Geneva (1961-62); the
"Kennedy Round" in Geneva (1964-67); and the "Tokyo Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Round" ("MTN" or "Tokyo Round") in Geneva (1973-79). See
id. at 658 n.8
The Uruguay Round was "by far the most ambitious trade negotiation
ever," for it included discussions about diverse topics such as goods and services,
intellectual property, investment, subsidies, dumping, and agriculture. See
Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 477; Riding, supra note 11, at 35 (stating that the
Uruguay Round embraced "for the first time such areas as agriculture, textiles
and financial services"). For a summary of all agreements finalized under the
Uruguay Round, see The Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Summary, FOCUS:
GATT NEWSLETTER, supra, at 5-15.
For an in-depth discussion of the history of the GATT, see ROBERT E.
HUDEC, TiE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2d ed.
1990); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note
13, at 30-39 (discussing the flawed constitutional beginnings of the GATT).
101 During the negotiation sessions, the proposed new organization was
entitled the "Multilateral Trade Organization." At the last moment, however,
negotiators replaced "multilateral" with "world," despite U.S. objections to this
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legally distinct organization in place of the GATT. 2 The
WTO provides the firm identity absent from the GATT and
fulfills the institutional framework originally envisioned by the
Bretton Woods economic system.0 3
change. See Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 478 n.1. The WTO, by requiring
adherence of all members to all but four GATT agreements, reinjects
uniformity into international trade law. See id. at 478-79. The only side
agreements outside the scope of the WTO concern civil aircraft, government
procurement, dairy products, and bovine meat. See id, at 479. All other
agreements, including the operation of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB"), are binding. See Final Act, supra note 11, at 33 I.L.M. 1153.
102 See The Road to Marrakesh, supra note 100, at 3. Unlike the GATT, the
WTO is an umbrella institution with a firm constitutional basis whose duties
include administering all relevant GATT codes, agreements, and understandings.
See Final Act, supra note 11, 33 I.L.M. at 114445. For example, the WTO will
oversee the GATT itself, agreements related to trade in services, and treaties
regarding intellectual property rights. See id. Annexes 1A-1C, at 1154-1225.
The WTO is headed by a Ministerial Council that meets every two years.
See Final Act, supra note 11, at 1145. A General Council meets regularly to
supervise all WTO operations. See id. The General Council governs tree
subsidiary Councils: a Goods Council, a Services Council, and a Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") Council. See id. at 1145-46.
Finally, the WTO oversees two adaitional "bodies" - the DSB and the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism. See Patterson & Patterson, supra note 17, at 46.
For a history of the forces leading to the creation of the WTO, see id. at
39-43. See generally JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 14, at 93-
100 (analyzing the problems associated with the original GATT system and
arguing for the creation of the WTO).
103 See Success! The Most Comprehensive Round Ever Is Concluded, FOCUS:
GATT NEWSLETTER, supra note 100, at 1, 2. "Bretton Woods" refers to the
international economic system that emerged following World War HI. See
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 4. The system
contemplated three institutional pillars: (1) the International Monetary Fund
(IMF"); (2) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("World Bank"); and () the International Trade Organization ("ITO"). See id.
Both the JMF and World Bank received international approval, but the ITO
did not - largely due to the United 
States failure to ratify the Havana
Charter, the founding document of the ITO. See generally i. at 3 1-37
(describing the Bretton Woods framework and the ITO); RICHARD N.
GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY: ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORA-TION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE (1956) (detailingthe fate of the Havana Charter). One of the explicit functions of the WTO is
to "cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and withthe International sank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated
agencies." Final Act, supra note 11, 33 IL.M. at 1145.
In the wake of the I1IO's failure, all that remained to fill the institutionalvacuum of international trade was the GATT agreement. See Montatii i Mora,
supra note 93, at 107. Although it was not an official international entity, the
GATT nevertheless built up a staff, occupied a building, hired a Director-
General, developed committees, budgets and agreements, and acquired many
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Once referred to as "a network of loopholes held together by
waivers,"10 4 the original GATT agreement was far from neat or
orderly, especially in the area of international dispute resolu-
tion.'05 As the GATT grew in size and scope, it "informally
developed the institutions that it need[ed] to run the multilateral
trading system."' 0 6 In addition to the piecemeal development of
the dispute resolution process, the entire GATT system rested on
the notions of pragmatism and tolerance'07 as opposed to legal-
ism or "rigorous adherence to legal norms."' The ad hoc,
pragmatic character of the GATT produced a dispute resolution
process primarily "aim[ed] at lowering tensions, defusing conflicts,
and promoting compromise."' °9 Indeed, what developed was
hardly a dispute settlement process, but rather a dispute avoidance
process which sought to prevent the "wrong cases" from entering
the system in the first place.
10
other attributes of an official international organization. See Lowenfeld, supra,
note 12, at 478. Not only did the GATT look like an organization, but it also
became the "most important multilateral economic treaty in history, both in
terms of contracting parties and in terms of the volume of trade regulated by
it." Montafia. i Mora, supra note 93, at 107. Over 100 protocols, arrangements,
side agreements, understandings, and other instruments have resulted from the
GATT foundation. See id. at 108.
04 Patterson & Patterson, supra note 17, at 35 (referring to a flippant
statement made by Eric Wyndham White, the first Secretary-General of the
GATT).
"' Prior to the Uruguay Round, more than 30 separate dispute resolution
procedures existed, all of varying degrees of formal authority to bind nations
to a given decision. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND TEXT 332-34 (1986); see also Patricia Kalla, The GA7TDispute Settlement
Procedure in the 1980s: Where Do We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82, 92
(1986) (noting that the former GATT dispute resolution process involved
procedures under six disparate dispute mechanisms adopted by nine codes at the
Tokyo Round); Montafia. i Mora, supra note 93, at 122-27 (discussing the
"diversification" or "balkanization" of GATT dispute procedures).
" Price, supra note 21, at 88.
107 See Patterson & Patterson, supra note 17, at 37. The first two Secretary-
Generals of the GATT, Eric Wyndham White and Oliver Long, both believed
in a pragmatic, as opposed to a legalistic management style. Long "believed
that 'legalism' does not contribute to trade liberalization." Id. at 36.
lOg Id.
101 Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 479.
"lo See Robert E. Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round:
An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159-66 (1980) (discussing
the Tokyo Round dispute settling reforms).
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3.2. The Pragmatic Model of the GATT
Dispute avoidance flourished under the pragmatic model of
dispute resolution during the early years of the GATT. The
pragmatic model, espoused by many "old GATT hands,""
primarily strives to reach "mutually satisfactory conclusions.""
2
This model is built on consensus,"' is skeptical of rules,14 and
encourages individual states to find equitable solutions. 115  Prior
to the Uruguay Round, a pragmatic, diplomatic model of dispute
I" Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 479. The European Union traditionally
supported the pragmatist model while the legalist model received its support
from the United States. See Montafia' i Mora, supra note 93, at 128-29. This
philosophical disagreement between the United States and the European Union
reflects a U.S. culture that is comfortable with a strong unifying legal force and
a European culture which prefers negotiated, diplomatic solutions. See Shell,
supra note 19, at 843. Recently, however, the European Union shifted toward
the legalist model and began to assume the role of GATT plaintiff, as opposed
to GATT defendant. See Montafia i Mora, supra note 93, at 128-36 (outlining
the traditional and current E.U. and U.S. positions with regard to the
pragmatist-legalist debate).
112 Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Settling Disputes in the GA 7T. The
Past, Present, and Future, 24 INT'L LAW. 519, 521 (1990) (citing GATT Doc.
No. L/4907, para. 4) (elaborating on the procedures for consultations) [herein-
after Bello & Holmer, Past, Present and Future].
113 Rule by consensus adopts a lowest common denominator approach. In
other words, all parties must agree to a given course of action or decision
before such action or decision takes effect. See Patterson & Patterson, supra
note 17, at 37. One observer has described consensus as "close to unanimity
. a state of non-objection, a resigned let-it-go." Pierre Pescatore, The GA TT
Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Situation and Its Prospects, J. INT'L
ARB., Mar. 1993, at 35.
114 Pragmatists defend a "power oriented" approach to international
relations that emphasizes negotiation based on sheer bargaining strength, as
opposed to adjudication basedon rules. See John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the
Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1571-72 (1984) (setting forth the rule-
oriented/power-oriented analytical framework).
"1 See Montafia i Mora, supra note 93, at 129. Trade pragmatists argue that
the GATT's success is due in part to its recognition of politics in the dispute
resolution process. See Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International
Adjudication, 75 MINN. L. REV. 827, 838 (1991) (noting the "relative success of
the GATT mechanism has been ... its recognition of a political role in the
process"). Nations will protect their vital interests, even if doing so technically
violates international norms. Nations also will accept adverse decisions,
however, when they predict that their acquiescence will achieve a greater goal
in the future. See id.
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resolution, based on GATT Articles XXII 1 6 and XX.I,"7 pre-
vailed." 8
The pragmatic dispute resolution process, codified after the
Tokyo Round,1 9 entailed four stages: (1) notification of a
nullification or impairment of benefits followed by bilateral and
possibly multilateral consultation;20 (2) establishment of an
expert panel to investigate the claim;121 (3) analysis and determi-
nation by the panel;'2 and (4) adoption or dismissal of the panel
116 See GATT, supra note 12, art. XXII, 61 Stat. at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266.
Article XXII(1) states that "each contracting party shall accord sympathetic
consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation
regarding, such representations as may be made by any other contracting party
with respect to ... all matters affecting the operation of this Agreement." Id.
117 See id. art. XXI[(1), 61 Stat. at A64, A65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 268
(providing for the establishment of a panel of all GATT contracting parties if
a contracting party's rights are nullified or impaired by the action of another
contracting party).
.. See Montafia i Mora, supra note 93, at 124. For a description of the
GATT panel process by a former GATT official, see generally Rosine Plank,
An Unofficial Description of How a GA TT Panel Works and Does Not, J. INT'L
ARB., Dec. 1987, at 53, 56-92. This GATT panel dispute resolution procedure
heard 207 complaints from 1948 to 1990. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM 273 (1993) (providing a statistical profile of GATT dispute
settlement cases).
119 Prior to the Uruguay Round, the Tokyo Round was the most
important and comprehensive series of negotiations since the 1947 inception of
GATT. See Montafia i Mora, sup-a note 93, at 122. Following the Tokyo
Round, the "Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute
Settlement and Surveillance" codified the dispute settlement procedures that
emerged over time. See GATT Doc. L/4907 (adopted Nov. 28, 1979, as part
of the Framework Agreement).
120 After notifying a nation of its complaint, the complainant first was to
discuss the issue with the alleged violator and, if no satisfactory agreement was
reached, then it was to discuss the problem with all contracting parties. This
consultation process is set forth in GATT, supra note 12, art. XXIII, 61 Stat.
at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 268.
121 The panel would be comprised of members from countries not involved
in the dispute. See Plank, supra note 118, at 65. The Chairman of the GATT
Council selects a panel with input from the parties and the Secretariat staff. Seeid.
122 A panel receives evidence, hears arguments, and issues a written
disposition of the complaint. See Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 479-82.
Frequently, a panel receives extensive input from the GATT Secretariat and its
staff. See id. at 485.
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report1'
At first blush, this pragmatic process appeared sensible. In
practice, however, at least three procedural deficiencies material-
ized. 24 First, the composition of the panel became a point of
serious contention.1" Second, any party could delay resolution
at any point in the process.126  For example, the losing party
could effectively veto an adverse panel decision in order to
prevent the decision from becoming binding 2z7 Finally, even if
the GATT convened a panel successfully and all parties adopted
a report, compliance was inevitably problematic. 128  Due to
massive disobedience, nations felt "no serious obligation to abide
by the rules" of dispute resolution. 129  Because the elaborate
system of rights under the GATT meant little absent an effective
dispute settlement procedure, 30 GATT signatories needed a new
2 See Bello & Holmer, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 112, at 523
(discussing the GATT dispute settlement process).
124 For a detailed description of the procedural problems arising under the
panel mechanism, see Stahl, supra note 13, at 424-26.
125 See, eg, Plank, supra note 118, at 65-72 (discussing the difficulty of
finding a suitable panel).
126 Since all GATT decisionmaking was by "consensus," one party could
block the formation of a panel or the adoption of a panel report and bring the
entire resolution process grinding to a halt. See supra note 113. The popularity
of these dilatory tactics flourished dramatically as the diversity of GATT
membership increased. See Montafia i Mora, supra note 93, at 119-20.
Essentially, the core principles underlying the GATT eroded prior to the
Tokyo Round as diverse members possessing conflicting economic needs joined
the agreement. See id. at 118-22.
12 See supra note 126.
128 An egregious example of purposeful delay occurred in the "Canned
Fruit" case where, following a U.S. complaint in 1981, the European
Community blocked the adoption of a panel report until 1985, at which point
the United States withdrew the report from the GATT Council agenda. For
a discussion of this case and other examples of the dilatory strategy in GATT
dispute resolution, see HUDEG, supra note 118, at 155-203; see also Bello &
Holmer, Past, Present and Future, supra note 112, at 525-32 (summarizing seven
of the more controversial GATT dispute cases, some of which exemylified the
use of the dilatory strategy). But see Partan, supra note 61, at 344 ( [C]hances
are that the delinquent partner will be ready to conform its conduct to [the]
GATT requirements. Hence GATT panel rulings are normally respected.").
129 Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, Objectives of the Uruguay Round,
in THE URUGUAY RoUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 7, 7 G. Michael Finger & Andrzej Olechowski eds., 1987).
13 See Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute
Settlement, in 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pts. 2, 3
(1995). In the entire history of the GATT, there was only one recorded in-
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dispute settlement system13' - one based on the legalist mod-
el.
132
3.3. The Legalist Model of the WTO
Unlike the pragmatic model of dispute resolution that
emphasizes political diplomacy, the legalist model13 revolves
around rules, remedies, and adjudication.134  Those supporting
this model argue that a more rule-oriented system ensures
certainty and predictability in the operation of international
affairs. 135 Because the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding
("Understanding")'36 adopted the legalist model, its creation
stance when the organization formally authorized the withdrawal of trade
benefits as a retaliatory measure for a GATT violation. See id. pt. 2, at 8 n.7;
Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Nov.
8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 32 (1953).
131 One scholar describes "four interests [which] converged to support a
proposal for a new WTO system for dispute resolution when the Uruguay
Round moved toward its conclusion in the late 1980s and early 1990s." Shell,
supra note 19, at 845. These four interests were: (1) a general desire by all
nations to move away from the threats and trade sanctions which had
characterized unilateralism; (2) a series of recommendations by eminent trade
scholars and officials which served as a focal point for final discussions; (3) a
realization by other GATT signatories, namely European countries, that the
dispute resolution process could advance their interests; and (4) a desire by
developing nations to level the GATT playing field. See id. at 84548.
132 For a discussion of an alternative to the pragmatic-legalistic structure,
see Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building
a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 111, 112-19
(1992) (utilizing a public-private interest model to analyze GATT dispute
resolution).
133 Trade legalism is based on neoclassical free trade theory and the foreign
relations theory of realism. See Shell, supra note 19, at 853-56. The post-Word
War H version of the foreign relations theory of realism followed a half-century
of a "legalistic-moralistic" approach to international problems. See GEORGE F.
KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950 95 (1951). In contrast to the
legalistic-moralisticapproach, realists believe sovereign nations are self-interested
actors engaged in the "single-minded pursuit of power." Shell, supra note 19,
at 855. As legalism has triumphed over pragmatism, the debate now shifts to
which model of legalism will gain currency within the WTO, the Regime
Management Model or the Efficient Market Model. For a comprehensive
discussion of these two legalist models and the introduction of a third model,
the Trade Stakeholder's Model, see id. at 858-925.
134 See Lowenfeld, supra note 12, at 479.
135 See Montafiai i Mora, supra note 93, at 129.
136 For an explanation of how the dispute resolution process works, see
Understanding, supra note 16, 33 I.L.M. at 122644.
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increasingly judicializes 117 the entire GATT dispute resolution
mechanism. The new dispute resolution procedure covers all
WTO agreements, making dispute resolution uniform within the
WTO.Y' The new WTO dispute resolution process makes near-
revolutionary139  changes in the prehearing, hearing, and
posthearing stages. For example, in the prehearing phase, a party
has a presumptive right to a panel unless, by consensus, all WTO
parties decide against the formation of a panel.' 4° Thus, the new
dispute resolution process effectively grants an "unambiguous right
to a panel."141  Additionally, the new WTO process imposes
strict timelines on all panel actions in the prehearing phase.'42
Moreover, the legalist model formally authorizes the Director-
General to assume an intermediary role.143
Additionally, the new process includes three major alter-
ations' 44 to the hearing or panel phase and tailors them to
137 See Montafia i Mora, supra note 93, at 144. The new WTO dispute
resolution process centers around the rule of law. See Georg M. Berrisch, The
Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent Practice in GATT, 16 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991) (declaring that the Uruguay Round
Agreements strengthen "the GATT system as a system governed by the rule of
law").
138 See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1226.
139 See Abbott, supra note 132, at 148. Some of the suggestions which were
eventually adopted in the Uruguay Round Agreements "turned the old GATT
voting system on its head." Shell, supra note 19, at 846.
140 See Understanding,supra note 16, art. 6(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1230. This is
a reversal of the presumption under the former system of dispute resolution.
Under the prior system, essentially there eitda presumption against the
creation of a panelunless all parties affirmatively agreed to establish a panel.
Reversing this presumption virtually guarantees the right to a panel. In order
to deny the formation of a panel, the complaining party would have to vote
against establishing a panel - an unlikely occurrence. See id.
141 Abbott, supra note 132, at 133.
142 See Understanding, supra note 16, arts. 4-16, 33 I.L.M. at 1228-35. Panel
time limits include: formation after 60 days from the complaint, see id. art.
4(7), 33 I.L.M. at 1229, issuing a report after six months, see id. art. 12(9), 33
I.L.M. at 1234, and Council consideration of the report within 60 days, see id.
art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
143 See id. art. 5(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1230. The new dispute resolution process
makes the notion of settlement more prominent through the use of good
offices, mediation, and conciliation. See i. art. 5(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1230. A party
may request these services at anytime, and the Director-General is affirmatively
authorized to assist the settlement. See Abbott, supra note 132, at 120.
144 Minor alterations include the status of third party interventions, an
interim review of the panel findings, and a tighter deadline to consider the
adoption of panel reports. See Understanding, supra note 16, arts. 10, 15, 16,
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remedy the problems associated with the pragmatic model. First,
the Understanding lists panelist qualifications.14 Second, a
standing Appellate Body will review a panel's legal interpreta-
tions. 146  The trade court appellate judges, however, will be
unaffiliated with any government.1 47 Finally, the WTO pre-
33 I.L.M. at 1232-33, 1235.
145 See id. art. 8(1), (2), 33 I.L.M. at 1231. The Secretariat will nominate
panelists (whether from the government or outside the government), and, if the
parties cannot agree on the panel's composition, the Director-General will
appoint these panelists. See id. art. 8(6), (7), 33 I.L.M. at 1231-32. The panel
is charged with rendering "an objective assessment of the facts of the case and
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements." Id.
art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1233. Towards this end, the "[p]anels should consult
regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity
to develop a mutuay satisfactory solution." id.
146 See id. art. 17(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1236-37. The standing Appellate Body
shall consist of seven members appointed by the DSB to serve in rotation. See
id. art. 17(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The Appellate Body will sit in panels of three
and hear all appeals confidentially. The members, appointed to four-year terms,
shall broadly represent the WTO membership, and possess demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade, and GATT affairs. See id. art. 17(3), 33
I.L.M. at 1236. Each judge may be reappointed only once. See id. art. 17(2),
33 LL.M. at 1236. Because the structure of the Appellate Body emphasizes
neutrality, independence, and expertise, it is the most legalistic GATT
institution to date.
147 See id. art. 17(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The Understanding does not set
forth detailed procedures for appointing these appellate judges. In general,
however, the members of the DSB shall act by consensus whenever possible.
See Final Act, supra note 11, art 9(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1148; Understanding, supra
note 16, art. 2(4), 33 I.L.M. at 1227. Not surprisingly, the appointment process
of the Appellate Body encountered political divisiveness. See Appellate Body
Consensus May Be Buildin Sources Say, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at
1560 (Sept. 20, 1995) (stating the problem "is that the United States and the
European Union have until now insisted that each have two of the seven seats,
while other counties have balked at ... an unfair weighting of the body in
favor of Washington and Brussels"). Finally, after several-months of wrangling,
the DSB has announced the new Appellate Body membership. The judges
include: James Bacchus, a former U.S. Congressman and former Special
Assistant to the USTR, Christopher Beeby, a trade diplomat and f6rmer
Ambassador from New Zealand, Klaus-Dieter Ehlermann, a German trade
lawyer and professor of international economic law, Florentino Feliciano, a
Filipino Supreme Court Justice and former trade lawyer, Julio Lacarte Muro,
a Uruguayan trade diplomat and participant in all eight GATT negotiation
rounds, Said el-Naggar, an Egyptian professor of economics, and Mitsuo
Matsushita, a Japanese professor of international economic law with ties to the
Japanese Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and Industr.
See Biographical Notes on Members of World Trade Organization Appeals Bo dy,
[July-Dec.] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 230, at M-1 (Nov. 30, 1995).
The E.U. envoy, Jean-Pierre Leng, however, warned that the E.U. only
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sumptively adopts an appellate report unless it decides by
consensus to reject such a report.I This consensus to overrule
procedure, coupled with a cumbersome legislative mechanism that
constrains the ability to override an appellate ruling, will give
final judicial decisions lasting force.149
Finally, in an effort to increase compliance with panel and
appellate decisions, the WTO dispute resolution process modifies
the implementation, or posthearing, phase in three ways. First,
any party that violates a covered agreement is required to report
its compliance status to the WTO within thirty days of the
adoption of the decision and at regular intervals thereafter.15
Second, should the guilty party default on its obligation, the
WTO may authorize the prevailing party to suspend concessions
or other obligations after a short period of negotiations with the
defaulting party.' Finally, if the defaulting party disagrees
with the level of sanction imposed or the dispute resolution proce-
dure followed, the issue will proceed to binding arbitration.
5 2
These changes embodied in the WTO constitute "a watershed
accepted the Appellate Body slate on an interim basis and would put forth a
proposal in December 1996 to reconfigure the Appellate Body in a way "which
better reflects the E.U.'s place in the WTO." WTO Reaches Accord on
Membership to New Appellate Body, Picks Members, [July-Dec.] Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 230, at A-12 (Nov. 30, 1995).
148 See Understanding, supra note 18, art. 17(14), 33 I.L.M. at 1237. This
reverses the former presumption and virtually ensures the adoption of the panel
report (if no appeal is taken) or the appellate report (if the right to appeal is
exercised) because the winning party or parties would have to reject the report.
149 See Shell, supra note 19, at 850-51. In order to override a final panel or
appellate decision, a party must propose a formal amendment to the relevant
treaty which, in most cases, requires unanimous consent for passage. See Final
Act, supra note 11, art. 10, 33 I.L.M. at 1149-50. In the alternative, a party may
propose that three-fourths of all treaty members must approve of an "interpre-
tation" of the treaty which effectively overrules the final panel or appellate
decision. See id. art. 9(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1148. Again, this interpretation
alteration approach requiring a supermajority is quite cumbersome. See Shell,
supra note 19, at 850-51.
150 See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 21(3), (6), 33 I.L.M. at 1238-39.
151 See id. art. 22(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1239. The DSB will authorize retaliation
if the disputing parties cannot reach an agreement providing for appropriate
compensation. See id.
152 See id. art. 22(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1240. As an alternative to the entire panel
and appellate process, the disputants may elect to proceed directly to binding
arbitration. See id. art. 25, 33 I.L.M. at 1242 (stating that when arbitration is
selected, the parties "shall agree to abide by the arbitration award").
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to Japanese auto dealer networks. 1 7
First, the United States argued that Japan's needless bureaucrat-
ic thicket plagued the entry of competitive U.S. auto parts into
the Japanese replacement market. The United States demanded
measures designed to deregulate Japan's complex auto repair
system, a system which channels the bulk of its repair work to a
network of Japanese "designated garages." These garages, in turn,
only purchase Japanese auto parts.158  Second, the Clinton
Administration claimed that Japan's unique interlocking business
relationships, known as "keiretsu,"159 stifled U.S. sales in the
auto component or supplies market." Finally, the United
157 See Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Auto andAuto Parts Agreement Issued By U.S.
Trade Representative s Office June 28, 1995, [Jan.-June] Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA) No. 125, at M-1 (June 29, 1995) [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheet].
Although two of the contentious issues technically involved automobile
component parts, this Comment refers collectively to the three issues as the
"automobile dispute."
158 Id. The general deregulation issue encompassed several specific
complaints. Fist, japanese regulations funnel the repair of any "critic part"
to certified garages, the only garages authorized to conduct the periodic inspec-
tions required by Japanese law. Second, the Japanese impose burdensome and
costly requirements in order to be licensed as a "designated" or "certified"
garage, including required amounts of minimum floor space, tools, and numbers
of certified mechanics. Since a "designated garage" license is difficult to receive
and since all "critical part" repairs are directed[to those "designated garages,"
U.S. auto part sales suffer at the hands of a tightly integrated Japanese
manufacturing and distribution system. Additionally, Japanese regulations
require that once a car is modified, even to a minute degree, the car must be
reinspected. This rigorous reinspection process hinders Japanese customers
from purchasing and adding accessories to their automobiles. These particulars,
to name a few, exclude foreign auto part manufacturers and distributors from
the Japanese repair market. Id. at M-1-M-2.
159 "Keiretsu" refers to "unique interlocking relationships between
manufacturers, suppliers, distributors and financial institutions." Id. at M-1.
A keiretsu is a network of firms with financial, managerial, and product market
interlinkages. Commentators have identified at least three roles of the keiretsu:
financial linkages which facilitate a focus on market share, producer-supplier
linkages which allow increased information exchange, and distribution linkages.
See C. FRED BERGSTEN & MARCUS NOLAND, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC CONFLICT 74-75 (1993).
160 See USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 157, at M-1. Over time, Japanese
automobile manufacturers have developed close business relationships wit their
component suppliers to the exclusion of foreign suppliers whose prices may be
lower. In order to break these purchasing patterns based on loyalty and not
on efficiency, Japanese auto manufacturers -have issued voluntary purchasing
plans in 1990, 1992, and 1994. Under these "voluntary plans," the Japanese
auto producers agree to purchase automotive supplies from sources other than
their-keiretsu partners. See id. at M-2.
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in the history of GATT dispute resolution."153 The WTO
dispute resolution process holds much promise, for it permits the
entry of any claim into the system, processes the claim in a timely
manner, grants an unambiguous right of appeal, virtually ensures
the adoption of the final judicial result, and pressures the losing
party to adjust its practices. Remarkably, the WTO judicial body
has "jurisdiction to rule that governments must amend or repeal
domestic laws that are inconsistent with world trade norms or
risk imposition of trade sanctions.""5 4
These bold changes signal a victory for law over politics in the
international dispute resolution process, a triumph for the trade
legalists over the trade pragmatists."' 5 As a result of the resur-
gence of multilateralism in world affairs"5 6 and the renewed
emphasis on the realities of global interdependence, a viable
multilateral dispute resolution alternative has emerged. The world
trading community has created a broad-based dispute resolution
mechanism in the WTO, thus tilting the balance away from
unilateralism and toward multilateralism.
4. THE UNILATERAL-MULTILATERAL CLASH: THE U.S.-
JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE DISPUTE
In the summer of 1995, the unilateral paradigm, section 301,
and the multilateral paradigm, the WTO dispute resolution
process, collided over the issue of automobiles and automotive
parts. The automobile trade controversy between the United
States and Japan focused upon three distinct issues. The Clinton
Administration, in exchange for dropping the unilateral section
301 sanctions, demanded: (1) deregulation of the auto part "after-
market" or replacement market; (2) increased voluntary purchases
of U.S. auto components by the Japanese; and (3) increased access
153 Abbott, supra note 132, at 141.
154 Shell, supra note 19, at 832 (footnote omitted).
115 See id. at 833-34.
156 Multilateralism has emerged not just in the world trade arena, but also
in the realm of world politics and aid. See John Linarelli, The European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 343, 374-75 (1995) ("[S]everal positive trends appear to be
emerging from the rubble of the Cold War. Significant among these trends is
an emphasis on, and optimism among states for, multilateral action.").
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States alleged that the Japanese auto dealership networks frustrated
the sales of U.S. automobiles.' 6' Without progress on these
three fronts, the Japanese faced the largest sanctions ever threat-
ened by the United States.
Article 1 of the Understanding defines its scope of application
as covering each Uruguay Round agreement, as well as the
Understanding itself.162  Thus, a WTO member may bring a
dispute alleging that a WTO signatory violated dispute settlement
procedures. 6 3 In this sense, the dispute resolution mechanism
is a self-enforcing process. Even before the United States
threatened unilateral sanctions in the summer of 1995, the
Japanese believed that use of section 301 violated the WTO.'
64
Not surprisingly, then, the Japanese government immediately filed
suit with the WTO to challenge the United States' use of
161 See id. Auto dealership start-up costs are very high in Japan, thus
forcing most foreign auto manufacturers to sell their vehicles through existing
dealerships. Japanese dealers, however, feel pressure not to sell foreign automo-
biles and-fear retribution by Japanese automobile manufacturers should they
decide to deal in foreign vehicles. Without joint dealerships or without dealers
exclusively selling U.S. automobiles, the quality and cost appeals of U.S. cars
will not translate into increased sales. See id.
162 See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 1(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1226; see also
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1009 (discussing the dispute
settlement proceedings).
163 The notion that a disagreement over the dispute resolution process can
be brought before a panel or the Appellate Body is uncontroversial. In fact,
USTR Mickey Kantor, during a Senate committee hearing, recognized the right
of another nation to challenge the United States' use of unilateral tariff
sanctions through the dispute resolution process. Kantor stated: "Where [the
Japanese] could go against [the United States] ... is in... items where we act
unilaterally and we invoke . . . tariff sanctions against [the Japanese]. Then
they might challenge us in the GATT .... They could challenge that [use of
unilateral sanctions." Overview of the Results of the Uruguay Round: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. HRG.
NO. 103-989, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1994) [hereinafter Senate Commerce
Hearing]. This situation described by USTR Kantor, where the United States
unilaterally invokes tariff sanctions against another party, is precisely what
developed in the U.S.-Japanese automobile dispute.
164 "If the United States investigates Japan and invokes retaliatory measures
in violation of the WTO Agreement, Japan should refer the matter immediately
to the GATT or DSB under [the] WTO." INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL
OF JAPAN, 1994 REPORT ON UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES BY MAJOR TRADING
PARTNERS 38 (1994) (discussing Japan's increased use of the GATT's dispute
settlement procedure since the 1980s) [hereinafter 1994 JAPANESE TRADE
REPORT].
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unilateral section 301 sanctions in the automobile dispute.65
The Japanese considered imposing countersanctions against the
United States, but "conceded that such a move would undermine
Japan's claim to be abiding by international trading rules."
1 66
The proper U.S. response, according to the Japanese, would have
been to file its trade grievance with the WTO, rather than
unilaterally applying sanctions. 67
With the United States poised to heap billions of dollars of
aggressive, unilateral section 301 sanctions upon luxury Japanese
automobiles, and with the Japanese challenging those sanctions
before the multilateral legalist WTO, the automobile dispute
settled in dramatic fashion. After sparring for six weeks and with
the credibility of the foremost world trade organization at stake,
the United States and Japan signed an agreement which, according
to the USTR, "will result in significantly increased market access
... and structural change in the Japanese automotive sector."
168
In substance, 69 the settlement deregulates Japan's auto parts
repair market,'70 includes pledges by the major Japanese auto
manufacturers to increase North American production and boost
165 The Japanese government filed suit with the WTO on the same day that
the United States announced the billions of dollars in S 301 sanctions. See
Andrew Pollack, Japan Plans Appeal to New Trade Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1995, at D4.
166 Id.
167 See id.
168 USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 157, at M-1.
169 Aside from resolving the three substantive U.S. complaints, the
settlement also provides for monitoring and enforcement for both the United
States and Japan. The United States' monitoring system will use objective data
to determine Japanese compliance. Any major problems with compliance "will
mean an instant return to the negotiating table," according to U.S. officials.
Mark Falsenthal et al., U.S., Japan Strike Deal on Auto Trade Addressing Parts,
Dealerships, Repairs, [Jan.-June] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 125, at A-
47, A49 (Gune 29, 1995). The Japanese will increase support for the Japan Free
Trade Commission, which will incorporate U.S. suggestions regarding Japan's
competition policy. See USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 157, at M-2.
170 The Japanese government agreed to review the list of "critical parts" and
remove from the list any parts "not central to health and safety concerns,"
including struts, shocks, power steering, and trailer hitches. In efforts to
deregulate the auto part repair market, the Japanese government will loosen its
definition of what modifications require reinspection, reduce the number of
required government approved mechanics, and allow specialty garages to repair
critical auto parts without being subject to government inspection. See USTR
Fact Sheet, supra note 157, at M-1-M-2.
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purchases of foreign-made automobile supplies,17 ' and presents
a plan both to ease the fears of Japanese dealers wishing to sell
U.S. automobiles and to facilitate the creation of joint U.S.-
Japanese dealerships in Japan.'72  Following the settlement,
WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero exclaimed: "The WTO
dispute settlement system has done its job as a deterrent against
conflict and a promoter of agreement."'7
5. BEYOND SETTLEMENT: LITIGATING A CHALLENGE TO
SECTION 301 BEFORE THE WTO
As an alternative to settling with the United States,"7 the
171 Japanese auto manufacturer assurances to increase North American
operations and to purchase more U.S. supplies is not an enforceable promise,
but rather a "business forecast." The top five Japanese automakers - Toyota,
Nissan, Mitsubishi, Honda, and Mazda -specified purchase plan numbers, but
stipulated that the plans are "voluntary" and outside the range of government
action. See Falsenthal et al., supra note 169, at A-50-A-51.
," The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry will send a
letter to all Japanese auto dealers affirming their freedom to sell foreign cars.
See USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 157, at M-2. Additionally, the government and
the auto manufacturers will appoint a "contact person" to address concern
about the right to sell foreign cars. See id. Finally, the Japanese government
will conduct a survey and use the contact persons to determine the best method
of facilitating the creation of joint dealerships. See id.
173 Falsenthal et al., supra note 169, at A49.
174 The U.S.-Japanese automobile dispute eleventh-hour settlement only
delays the day when another challenge to unilateral sanctions ripens and comes
before the WTO. Exploring the arguments that could be presented to a panel
or an Appellate Body is, therefore, not a mere academic exercise. In tact, a
range of high-profile trade disputes which might eventually involve unilateral
sanctions are taking shape already in the film, air delivery, banana, horse racing,
and eanut butter industries, to name a few.
irst, less than a week after the automobile dispute ended, the USTR,
stating that "'it is critical that U.S. firms.achieve full access to Japan's market,'"
announced a S 301 investigation into the practices of Fuji Photo Film. Robert
D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. to Assess Kodak's Case Against Fuji, N.Y. TIMES, July 4,
1995, at 45. The Eastman Kodak Company., aided by trade experts at the law
firm of Dewey Ballantine Bushby Palmer & Wood in Washing-ton D.C.,
submitted a 250-page § 301 petition to the USTR, described as "part legal brief,
part business school casestudy[,] and part crime novel." Clay Chandler & Paul
Blustein, Kodak Sets Out to Prove fapan's Market for Film Is Rigged, WASH.
POST, June 26, 1995, at Al. The petition "depicts an economy in which
government planners reshape[d] entire industries" and "worked to help Fuji
stamp out price competition among distributors," costing Kodak $5.6 billion
in lost revenues, Id. at Al, A12. Clinton Administration officials believe
Kodak's claim is much stronger than those mounted by the automobile
industry. See id. Fuji responded by stating "that it regretted the [U.S.] decision
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Japanese could have held firm and challenged the premature use
of section 301 before a WTO panel and eventually the Appellate
Body.175 WTO Director-General Ruggiero indicated that the
WTO was unlikely "to rule on Japan's complaint against U.S.
sanctions by itself, but would [have] tak[en] both complaints
under [simultaneous] consideration." 176 Litigating a matter of
such grave importance, however, should not be approached in a
single proceeding. Separating the substantive U.S. grievance from
the Japanese procedural challenge to unilateral sanctions is
sensible. A bifurcated resolution process would allow the
Appellate Body to concentrate fully on the question of unilateral
action apart from the substantive specifics of "competition policy"
and the detailed regulation of "after markets." Conflating the
to initiate a [S] 301 action, rather than dealing with Kodak's charges 'through
more constructive channels' . . . at the new World Trade Organization in
Geneva." Hershey, supra, at 45, 47.
Second, in addition to the dispute over photographic film, the United
States threatened sanctions "on Japanese airlines' all-cargo operations because
Japan has not allowed Federal Express Corp. to operate fligfits through Japan
to some other points in Asia." Don Phillips, U.S. Plans Cargo Sanctions Against
JapaneseAirlines, WASH. POST, June 20, 1995, at D1. Finally, other current dis-
putes include a U.S.-E.U. dispute over bananas, see Martin Crutsinger, U.S. to
File WTO Complaint Over European Banana Trade Barriers, Assoc. PRESS, Sept.
27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database, and U.S. complaints of
excess Japanese bureaucracy in the peanut butter, race horse, motorcycle,
medical supply, financial service, and fresh fruit industries, see U.S. Urges Japan
to Further Open Markets, ASSOc. PRESS, Nov. 22, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database. In any of these disputes, the United States
might prematurely invoke unilateral sanctions before the WTO dispute
resolution runs its course, thus triggering a challenge to the unilateral use of
sanctions by a WTO signatory.
'75 The Appellate Body has the ultimate authority to review "legal findings
and conclusions." See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 17(13), 33 I.L.M. at
1237. Therefore, this Comment will explore a challenge to the use of unilateral
sanctions through the eyes of the Appellate Body. The challenge first will be
presented at the panel level. This Comment assumes a panel decision of such
importance as the legality of unilateral sanctions likely would be appealed in
accordance with the Understanding. See id.
For the sake of this analysis, this Comment assumes that the parties
adhered to the "prelitigation" requirements such as notification of a dispute,
consultation between disputants, consideration of mediation and good offices,
and request for a panel. This Comment further assumes that all attempts to
resolve the dispute proved unsuccessful. Such "prelitigation" requirements are
set forth in the Understanding. See Understanding, supra note 16, arts. 4-6, 33
I.L.M. at 1228-30.
176 Martha M. Hamilton, W'TO Head Hopes for Trade Deal, WASH. POST,
June 15, 1995, at B1l.
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substantive issues with the procedural complaint would draw
attention to results, to the detriment of the procedural issue at
stake.
When a nation challenges unilateral sanctions, the Appellate
Body must first determine the threshold issue of jurisdiction. In
other words, the Appellate Body must decide whether the case
presents a colorable WTO claim, thus giving the Appellate Body
the authority to hear the case. Next, after resolving the jurisdic-
tional issue, the Appellate Body must address whether the "add to
or diminish" clause of Understanding Article 3(2) prevents the
WTO from rendering a dispositive ruling on a case." In
accordance with the framework established in Article 12 of the
Understanding,17 8 this Comment analyzes the hypothetical
challenge to unilateral sanctions by explaining the Japanese
position on the automobile dispute, discussing the U.S. response,
and exploring the Japanese reply to the U.S. response.
5.1. The Japanese Challenge
5.1.1. The Jurisdictional Question: Article 23
The Japanese argument - that the premature use of unilateral
sanctions, such as section 301, violates the WTO Agreement - is
grounded in Article 23 of the Understanding.1 79  Article 23(1),
The Understanding states that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided! in the
covered agreements." Understanding, supra note 16, art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
178 Article 12 of the Understanding details the panel hearing process. It
states: 'The complaining party shall submit its first submission in advance of
the responding party's first submission unless the panel decides ... that the
parties should submit their first submissions simultaneously." Understanding,
supra note 16, art. 12(6), 33 I.L.M. at 1233. Moreover, "[a]ny subsequent
written submissions shall be submitted simultaneously." Id. While the
Understanding explains the panel procedures in detail, it ails to make clear the
working procedures of the Appellate Body. These are yet to be determined.
Assuming that the Appellate Body will adopt working procedures similar to
those of the panels, the presumption of the complaint-response-reply format is
an appropriate framework for analysis.
179 The Japanese challenge to § 301 through Article 23 of the Under-
standing is only one line of possible argumentation. Another Japanese strategy
might be to argue that unilateral S 301 sanctions in the automobile dispute
violated Article XI of the GATT. Article XI, entitled General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions, states:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
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entitled Strengthening of the Multilateral System, states: "When
Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agree-
ments or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the
rules and procedures of this Understanding."180 In other words,
if either a violation of a WTO obligation, a nullification or
impairment of a WTO benefit, or an impediment to a WTO
objective occurs, then a colorable WTO claim is implicated and
a signatory must channel its complaint through the WTO. In
these three situations, the signatory nation may not employ
unilateral sanctions at the outset to remedy an alleged WTO
violation. The scope of Article 23 is quite broad given the
numerous ways in which a WTO signatory could violate an
obligation, nullify or impair a benefit, or impede a WTO
objective. In essence, Article 23 dictates that the WTO is to have
the first attempt at dispute resolution.
In addition to requiring the WTO to be the forum of "first
resort," the Understanding limits unilateral action in at least three
other ways. First, the WTO signatory "shall not make a
determination" that a violation, impairment, or impediment has
occurred, except through recourse to the WTO dispute resolution
procedure. 1' In effect, this mandate delays any domestic action
on the trade dispute until the WTO dispute resolution process
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
or of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for
export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.
GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226.
The argument that S 301 sanctions on automobiles violates this GATT
provision is as follows: (1) the Japanese want to sell cars in the United States;
(J a § 301 sanction is not a duty, tax or other charge; (3) S 301 is made
efective through "other measures;" and (4) the effect of S 301 sanctions is to
restrict, and perhaps prohibit, the ability of the Japanese to sell cars in the
United States. Thus, S 301 sanctioning in the automobile dispute violates
GATT Article XI(1). Because there are institutional reasons for wanting to
derail S 301, the Japanese government would also assert the Article 23 claim in
the automobile dispute. This Comment addresses the Article 23 argument
because the unilateral-multilateral clash occurs under Article 23.
180 Understanding, supra note 16, art. 23(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1241 (emphasis
added).
"I See id. art. 23(2)(a), 33 I.L.M. at 1241.
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runs its course. Second, if the complaining signatory receives a
favorable WTO ruling on an issue, the nation cannot act immedi-
ately, but instead must wait for a "reasonable period of time for
the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and
rulings" of the WTO.182 Finally, even if a complaining signato-
ry addresses the WTO before taking any action, waits for a WTO
ruling, and then allows a reasonable amount of time for compli-
ance, it cannot sanction as it sees fit. The complaining signatory
must adhere to the procedures of the Understanding to determine
the extent of permissible retaliation."'
Thus, in order to bring the automobile dispute within the
purview of Article 23, the Japanese must first establish that the
underlying U.S. complaint is really a WTO-based complaint
which involves the violation of a WTO obligation, the impair-
ment of a WTO benefit, or the impediment of a WTO objective.
The dispute is channeled to the WTO for multilateral resolution
once the Japanese establish that the U.S. complaint addresses the
violation, nullification/impairment, or impediment of a WTO
obligation, benefit, or objective.
The Japanese likely would argue that, of all the automobile
issues presently disputed, the deregulation of the bureaucratic
thicket surrounding the auto part replacement market most clearly
states a colorable WTO claim, as excess regulation violates a WTO
obligation, impairs a WTO benefit, or impedes a WTO objec-
tive.1 4  Excess regulation in the form of critical part lists,
arbitrary certification and licensing processes, as well as undue
inspection costs for minor automotive accessories,"8 5 involves a
WTO claim under at least three GATT provisions: Article XI,
112 Id. art. 23(2)(b), 33 I.L.M. at 1241.
I See id. art. 23(2)(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1242.
1s4 The Japanese would likely shy away from the dealership access and
component supplier issues because these two issues implicate the Japanese
network of interlocking business relationships. The Japanese must remain cau-
tious in seeking WTO jurisdiction to hear the S 301 challenge; the Japanese
would want to argue that a WTO dispute lies at the heart of the U.S.
complaint without acknowledging that the Japanese keiretsu system itself is
subject to the WTO dispute resolution process. Arguing that the U.S.
complaint about dealerships and component suppliers implicates a WTO
agreement invites the United States to adjudicate the entire keiretsu system
before the WTO.
1.. See supra note 158 for a discussion of the specific regulations at issue in
the automobile dispute.
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Article XXXIII and the Preamble.
First, excess regulation in the auto part replacement market
violates a WTO obligation under GATT Article XI(1). 6 By
imposing stringent regulations on this market, the Japanese violate
a fundamental GATT tenet: no restrictions "other than duties,
taxes or other charges... shall be instituted or maintained by any
contracting party on the importation" of another contracting
party's products.1 7 This prohibition could very well encompass
the licensing and inspection regulations that surround the Japanese
auto part replacement market and that are unrelated to safety
concerns.
Second, excess regulation in the Japanese auto part replacement
market impairs a WTO benefit under Article XXIII(1)."8 The
heart of the U.S. complaint about excess bureaucracy in this
market is that although the United States has successfully
negotiated tariff reductions in the area of auto parts, Japanese
bureaucratic barriers are measures which indirectly impair these
tariff reduction agreements. Thus, while excess regulation of the
replacement market does not itself conflict with a negotiated
WTO agreement, the excess regulation is inconsistent with and
impairs the negotiated tariff reductions in the auto parts industry.
Finally, excess regulation in the auto part replacement market
impedes an objective stated in the GATT Preamble. 9 Excessive
regulation in any market impedes many GATT objectives,
186 See supra note 179 for the language of Article XI.
187 See GATT, supra note 12, art. XI(1), 61 Stat. at A32-A33, 55 U.N.T.S.
224, 226.
188 Article XXflI(1) states:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to
it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired ... as the result of ... (b) the application by another
contracting party of a measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other
situation, the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory
adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals
to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be
concerned.
Id. art. XXII(1), 61 Stat. at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266, 268 (emphasis added).
.89 The second paragraph states the GATT objectives as "raising standards
of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume
of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the
world and expanding the production and exchange of goods ..... Id. pmbl., 61
Stat. at All, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/9
ADJUDICA TING SECTION 301
especially maximizing utilization of the world's resources and
expanding the production and exchange of goods. The bureaucrat-
ic thicket surrounding the Japanese auto part replacement market
is inconsistent with the noble GATT objectives of efficient utiliza-
tion, effective demand, and maximally beneficial exchange.
After characterizing at least one U.S. complaint - excess
regulation in the auto part replacement market - in Article 23
terms, thereby establishing WTO jurisdiction," ° the United
States would be locked into the subsequent Article 23 require-
ments. These requirements mandate the WTO as the forum of
first resort, delay the use of unilateral action until the WTO rules,
dictate a reasonable time to implement the ruling, and allow
WTO pre-approved retaliation.
5.1.2. Intent of the Signatories
The plain language of Article 23 sets forth "a pledge by WTO
members to refrain from unilateral action in the global trade
arena."191 Drawing largely upon the plain language of Article
23, European officials have determined:
The GATT does not allow for... unilateral action by any
one of the contracting parties aimed at inducing another
contracting party to bring its trade policies in conformity
with [the] GATT.... Accordingly, for the United States,
this means that section 301 and its hybrids will have to
undergo revision in order to ensure compliance with the
new WTO dispute settlement structure.
19 2
"' Not only is the scope of Article 23 quite wide, but if the United States
has not notified the WTO of its grievance in the first place, the Japanese could
construe and articulate the U.S. complaint as it pleases, thus ensuring that the
U.S. complaint falls within the scope of Article 23.
'9' Shell, supra note 19, at 852.
192 140 CONG. REC. S15,329 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Hollings, quoting from a European Commission document). Without
explaining his legal reasoning or addressing Article 23, USTR Kantor concluded
that the WTO does not for-bid premature unilateral action. Before a Senate
committee, Kantor stated that "just because the European Community puts out
a piece of paper indicating they do not think [S] 301 is viable under the new
trade agreement does not make it so. Frankly, they are just wrong, and they
know they are wrong, and we discussed it in our negotiations." Senate
Commerce Hearings, supra note 163, at 52. Unless the WTO court is willing
to interpret these "negotiations" as legislative history that trumps the plain
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Like the Europeans, 93 the Japanese have reached a similar
conclusion that "the threat of sanctions is not compatible with the
multilateral trade system of the GATT/WTO."19 4 Many WTO
signatories view the intent of Article 23 to stifle unilateral action,
including, and perhaps even specifically directed towards, the
internationally-dreaded section 301.195 The plain language of
Article 23, as well as its stark title, Strengthening of the Multilateral
System, embody the intent of the signatories to impede unilateral
action, to promote multilateral resolution, and to vest within the
WTO a presumptive authority to initially hear any dispute that
invokes a colorable WTO claim. Even if the United States
construes Article 23 in a manner consistent with the premature
use of section 301,196 there is substantial evidence that other
WTO parties intended to hamper, if not foreclose altogether,
unilateral action like section 301. From the Japanese standpoint,
language of the agreement, it is difficult to conceive how the Europeans are
"wrong" with regard to premature unilateral sanctions when the issue at stake
is one involving the violation, nullification/impairment, or impediment of
WTO obligations, benefits, or objectives.
113 See generally SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON THE
UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 7-11 (1994) (explaining
further how the Europeans interpret the inconsistency between S 301 and the
WTO).
194 1994 JAPANESE TRADE REPORT, supra note 164, at 259. The Japanese
state that "the United States also has a tendency to resort to policies and
measures based on unilateral judgments. ... Inconsistency between these
[unilateral] provisions and WTO dispute settlement procedures will continue
to be a big problem." Id. at 24-25.
195 See supra section 2.4 for a discussion of the international response to the
use of S 301.
196 Any attempt to construe Article 23 to allow the use of premature
unilateral sanctions is a formalistic argument which ignores what congressional
leaders knew throughout their debates on the Uruguay Round Agreements,
namely that 'the unilateral action provisions of Section 301 ... will not survive
the WTO's Dispute Resolution Article 23." 140 CONG. REC. S15,144 (daily ed.
Nov. 30, 1994) (letter from Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach to USTR Michael
Kantor). In fact, the Congressional Research Service's American Legal Division
issued an opinion memo "about [S] 301 being effectively gutted by Article 23's
ban on 'unilateralism.'" Id.
Conversely, the shrinking sphere of S 301 use could have nothing
whatsoever to do with Article 23, but rather could be the natural result ot
bringing more substantive areas, like intellectual property and financial services,
under the WTO umbrella. The need for 5 301 to discipline trade behavior
diminishes as the WTO extends to a greater number of substantive trade areas.
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the plain language of Article 23 and the intent of the signatories
establishes WTO jurisdiction to rule upon the automobile dispute.
5.2. The U.S. Response
In defending the unrestricted use of section 301 sanctions, the
United States could present at least two arguments. First, the
United States could argue a "four corners" jurisdictional defense,
stressing that because the automobile dispute is outside the four
corners of any WTO agreement, section 301 sanctions are
permitted. In the alternative, assuming that the underlying
dispute does fall within the four corners of a WTO agreement, the
United States could argue the "add to or diminish" affirmative
defense. This defense contends that any WTO restriction upon
section 301 "add[s] to or diminish[es] the rights and obligations"
of the United States in violation of Articles 3 and 19 of the
Understanding. 9
5.2.1. No Jurisdiction: The "Four Corners" Argument
The first U.S. argument in defense of the use of section 301 is
the "four corners" defense. If a WTO agreement does not cover
the issue or action prompting the use of unilateral sanctions, the
United States is free to utilize the trade mechanism of its choice.
In the automobile dispute, the four corners defense alleges that
since the three allegations against the Japanese fall outside the
WTO agreements, there is no Article 23 violation.
The "four corners" defense contains at least three separate
categories: the uncovered party, the uncovered issue, and the
117 Article 3(2) of the Understanding states:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
The Members [of the WTO] recognize that it serves to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and
to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish
the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Understanding, supra note 16, art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1227 (emphasis added).
Article 19(2) further states: "In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in
their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appel ate Body cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
Id. art. 19(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
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uncovered practice.'98 In other words, if a unilateral action
targets a party that has not acceded to the WTO, an issue not
covered by a WTO Agreement, or a trade practice that is not
justiciable by the WTO, then Article 23 will not apply. Without
Article 23 in the picture, the United States may act unilaterally
and unleash the full force of section 301. First, the WTO lacks
jurisdiction to hear a case involving a nonsignatory. This branch
of the "four corners" defense does not apply to the U.S.-Japanese
automobile dispute, since both parties are full signatories to the
Uruguay Round Agreements.'99
Second, the United States believes it is not bound by the
Understanding "when the Trade Representative considers that an
investigation does not involve a Uruguay Round Agreement.
2
00
As clarified in the President's Statement of Administrative Action,
"[t]he Administration ... intends to use section 301 to pursue
foreign unfair trade barriers that are not covered by [the Uruguay
Round] [A]greements."'2 ' The United States would argue under
the second prong of the four corners defense that the automobile
dispute issues, such as regulation of the replacement part market,
access to dealerships, and supplier purchasing relationships, do not,
even tangentially, involve WTO covered agreements. Even if
Japan could identify a specific WTO provision which covers any
of the three automobile dispute issues, 2 the United States
intends to utilize section 301 in "mixed action" cases where some,
but not all, of the issues are covered by a WTO agreement.2 3
Third, the WTO does not have jurisdiction to hear certain
types of cases, such as anticompetitive practices, that fall outside
the organization's scope of expertise. The President's Statement
of Administrative Action articulates that "[s]hould the Trade
Representative elect to investigate the failure by a foreign
198 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1035-36.
'9' See Final Act, supra note 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1131.
200 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1018.
201 Id. at 1033. Congress provided further evidence of its intent to use
301 to combat barriers not covered by the WTO Agreements. In the WTO
implementing legislation, Congress clearly reserved the right to use § 301 when
an issue outside the WTO Agreements was involved. See id. at 1027; see also
supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' role should the
WTO act unreasonably in actions against the United States).
202 See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
203 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1035.
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government to take action against systematic, anticompetitive
distribution practices, . . . section 301 would remain fully available
to challenge such a failure."2°4 With respect to these systematic
anticompetitive practices, "[t]he United States has expressed the
view in the GATT, and will maintain the view in the WTO, that
. . . a panel should refrain from opining on complex, unsettled
issues of domestic law."20 In the automobile dispute, the U.S.
would argue that at least two of the issues, access to dealerships
and supplier purchasing arrangements, fall outside the four corners
of the WTO because those issues involve complex issues of
domestic competition law. In the context of the automobile
dispute, the United States would stand firm in its ability to utilize
section 301 sanctions, if desired, arguing that the dispute landed
beyond the scope of WTO expertise.
5.2.2. The Japanese Reply to the 'Tour Corners" Defense
Recognizing that "[t]he United States is taking the position
that it is entitled to continue invoking ... [s]ection 301 concern-
ing problems outside the scope of the WTO Agreement,"
20 6
Japan has formulated a response to the "four corners" defense.
Concentrating on the targeted market, i.e. the Japanese luxury
automobile market, the Japanese argue that "[i]f the retaliatory
measures fall within the scope of [a] WTO [a]greement, the
measures should be recognized as a violation of [a] WTO
[a]greement." 207 In other words, if an area of dispute involves
issues outside those covered by the WTO agreements, but the
WTO covers the area of targeted retaliation, then such retaliatory
measures would violate the Understanding.2 8 Retaliation would
only be permitted, according to this Japanese view, in a situation
where the disputed area was outside the WTO agreements and the
area targeted for retaliation was also not covered by a WTO
204 Id. at 1035. The Statement of Administrative Action cites reciprocal
dealing, exclusivity, and tying arrangements as types of anticompetitive actions
subject to the unilateral use of S 301. See id.
205 Id. at 1012. The Statement of Administrative Action admonishes panels
for opining on such domestic issues because by doing so, a panel will "risk
raising questions about the immediate and continued validity of their reports
and may undermine confidence in the dispute settlement process." Id.
206 1994 JAPANESE TRADE REPORT, supra note 164, at 240.
207 Id. (emphasis added).
208 See id. at 239-40.
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agreement. 2 °9 In other words, it is not the underlying cause
prompting the sanctions which gives the WTO jurisdiction, but
rather the nature of the sanctioned target which determines WTO
jurisdiction. Targeting automobiles for punitive sanction therefore
violates Article 23 regardless of the nature of the underlying U.S.
complaint because automobiles are covered under the WTO.
5.2.3. The "Add To or Diminish" Defense
The United States could assert the "add to or diminish"
affirmative defense should the Appellate Body reject the "four
corners" argument. Article 3(2) of the Understanding states the
general provision that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements."210 Similarly, panels and the Appellate
Body, in accordance with the general provision of Article 3(2),
cannot make findings or recommendations that "add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements." 1 Therefore, neither the DSB functioning as an
institution, nor the Appellate Body serving as adjudicators of
specific disputes, may alter the substantive rights and obligations
of the parties. Article 9 of the Final Act directs the WTO
209 See id.
210 Understanding, supra note 16, art. 3(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
211 Id. art. 19(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
112 The ambiguity inherent in the "add to or diminish" clause leads to a
range of statutory interpretations for which the Appellate Body will have to
provide future guidance. First, a literal interpretation concludes that since the
clause reads "add to or diminish the rights and obligations, the WTO may
require the alteration of both a right and an obligation. Following the literal
interpretation, the United States, in order to obtain the protection of Article
19 of the Understanding, would have to argue that any added or diminished
U.S. obligation accompanies a commensurately added or diminished U.S. right.
For example, the United States would argue that a restriction on the right to
use S 301 diminishes its right to use domestic trade laws and increases its
obligation to bring all disputes before the WTO.
Second, a looser construction and an easier argument to make could inter-
pret "rights and obligations" as rights or obligations, thus requiring the United
States only to show that a WTO action either adds to or diminishes any U.S.
right or obligation. Under this construction, the United States only would
have to demonstrate a restricti on domestic trade rights without addressing
a commensurately added or diminished obligation or vice versa.
A third construction ties the rights and obligations in question to those
"provided in the covered agreements." Thus, the United States, in order to
assert the defense, would have to point to a specific right or obligation in the
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signatories to act by consensus if a WTO action substantively
alters the rights and obligations of signatories .2 " Thus, if an
Appellate Body decision adds to or diminishes the rights or
obligations of a signatory, the affected signatory first must
approve such an alteration before the ruling can acquire the force
of law.
214
The United States, in order to protect its unrestricted use of
section 301, would argue that any appellate decision constraining
the use of section 301 diminishes the substantive rights of the
United States in an unacceptable manner by foreclosing access to
legitimately adopted domestic trade laws. In joining the WTO,
the United States could not possibly have granted the WTO an
ability to dictate the scope of its domestic trade laws. Conse-
quently, any restriction on section 301 would be a windfall to
Japan in the sense that WTO tinkering with section 301 shifts
leverage from the United States to Japan. The United States
would argue that when analyzing the section 301 challenge in this
manner, the WTO should not undertake to resolve the issue. In
response, the Japanese would argue that the "add to or diminish"
clause is limited, solely designed to address systematic, repeated
instances where a panel or appellate decision either imposes
additional obligations or diminishes rights of a substantive nature.
6. THE FUTURE OF THE UNILATERAL PARADIGM: THE
RULING ON THE CHALLENGE TO SECTION 301 SANCTIONS
If the function of the Appellate Body is "to act as a kind of
'Supreme Court' of the WTO,21s then this hypothetical
groundbreaking decision, where multilateral resolution triumphs
covered agreement that either is added to or diminished. Such a construction
surely will send a defendant scouring through every covered agreement for the
golden right or obligation that is added to or diminished by any WTO action.
213 "The WTO shall continue the practice of decisionomaking by consensus
followed under GATT 1947." Final Act, supra note 11, art. 9(l), 33 I.L.M. at
1148; see also MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 659 (stating
that "there can be no change in U.S. substantive rights and obligations without
the agreement of the United States").
214 If the substantive alteration in rights or obligations is profound, such as
the prohibition on the use of a domestic legal tool lIe S 301, it is unlikely that
there would be a consensus, as the affected nation is unlikely to repeal
voluntarily a national law and in the process sacrifice its sovereignty.
21' GA TT/WTO: Chairman Halts Discussions on Appellate Body's Member-
ship, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1310-11 (Aug. 2, 1995).
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over unilateral retaliation, might have a John Marshall-like quality
to it.216  In the words of Justice John Marshall, the Appellate
Body essentially should declare that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. . . . If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each."21 7 Similarly, in the automobile
dispute, it is "emphatically the province and duty" of the
Appellate Body to say what the WTO law is. When section 301
and Article 23 collide, the WTO must address this collision and
resolve it in an unambiguous manner. This section explores the
hypothetical ruling, the reasoning behind the Appellate Body's
decision, and the remedies appropriate to redress the violation.
6.1. The Legal Ruling
After considering the merits of the challenge to the United
States' use of unilateral sanctions, the Appellate Body must issue
a written disposition of the case. In the hypothetically-
litigated automobile dispute, the Appellate Body should rule that
(1) the WTO has jurisdiction to hear such a complaint and (2) the
use of unilateral sanctions violates the plain language of Article 23
of the Understanding without implicating or affecting the "add to
or diminish" clause.
First, the WTO should recognize that the U.S. complaint in
the automobile dispute presents a colorable WTO claim. Even if
only one of the sub-issues involved - excess regulation of the auto
part replacement market - implicates a WTO obligation, benefit,
or objective, the WTO should assume jurisdiction under Article
216 This momentous Appellate Body decision, which would suppress
unilateral action in favor of multilateral resolution, would be similar to John
Marshall's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 430 (1819), in that
"[w]e are relieved.., from a repugnancy between a right in one government
to pull down what there is an ackriowledged right in another government to
build up; from the incompatibility of a right in one government to destroy
what there is a right in another to preserve." By striking down unilateralism
in favor of multilateralism, the WTO would send a clear Marshall-like message:
the power of a part cannot be allowed to contravene the power of the whole,
lest the overarching institution to which all have acceded will collapse. See id.
at 435-36 ("The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist,
between the action of a whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole.
217 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
218 See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 17(5), 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
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23 to hear the dispute and reject the "four corners" defense. After
stripping away all legal formalism and political posturing, this
battle over jurisdiction digs at the heart of the WTO and asks a
basic question: who has the authority to rule? If Article 23
wields any authority, it affirms the multilateral system as the
forum of first review. The WTO is free to declare that an issue
is outside the scope of its expertise, but only the WTO can make
such a determination. A signatory cannot arrest the unanimously
approved dispute resolution procedure and aggregate to itself the
power to judge the WTO's paramount position as the forum of
first review.
Second, the Appellate Body should rule that the "add to or
diminish" clause does not apply to the automobile dispute. The
only logical interpretation of "add to or diminish" is to restrict it
to the rare situation when a panel or an appellate board repeatedly
and systematically subjects a nation to adverse decisions. The
clause creates an escape hatch which allows a nation, only in the
most extreme situations and after continuous defeat, to refuse to
obey a WTO-adopted decision without withdrawing as a signato-
ry. Any other interpretation of the "add to or diminish" clause
would frustrate every panel and appellate decision as nations, after
losing a case, would invariably argue that the negative decision
added to their obligations or diminished their rights.
6.2. 7he Policy Reasoning
The creation of a new global trading entity, such as the WTO,
fundamentally alters the functioning of existing institutions and
trading rules. Moreover, just as the WTO affects existing trade
laws, those same trade laws will shape the evolution and develop-
ment of the WTO. This interplay between an emerging institu-
tion and existing legal structures suggests two basic policy
rationales for why the Appellate Body should declare the
premature use of unilateral section 301 sanctions as violative of the
WTO's dispute resolution procedure.
First, the emerging WTO dispute resolution process under-
mines the existing rationale and strategy behind section 301. The
world trading system has evolved to the point where unilateral
action is largely unnecessary due to the negotiation of comprehen-
sive substantive agreements and the development of a rule-oriented
dispute resolution process. Moreover, unilateral action is
detrimental to the world trading system in an interdependent
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world. Second, the existing legal structure, section 301, may
potentially may the world trading system and undermine the
effectiveness of the emerging institution, the WTO. The contin-
ued premature use of section 301 will emasculate the power of the
WTO, an entity whose success will aid in "raising standards of
living, ensuring full employment[,]... and expanding the produc-
tion of and trade in goods and services .... -219 These policy-
based reasons justify the Appellate Body striking down section 301
and any other similar unilateral measures.
6.2.1. The WTO's Eflect on Section 301
The establishment of the WTO's dispute resolution process
eliminates the need for section 301 authority. The Understanding
addressees both the problems to which section 301 owes its genesis
and undermines the fundamental strategy upon which section 301
relies.
6.2.1.1. Undermining the Origins of Section 301
The United States should halt its mandatory use of section 301
because the Understanding addresses the concerns and problems
which spurred the creation of the statute. The conditions which
gave rise to the present-day section 301 were the GATT's
painfully slow, ineffective dispute resolution process22° and its
concomitant inability to combat "the dilatory strategy."
2
2
1
These Shortcomings in the GATT dispute resolution process
motivated Congress to create and subsequently strengthen section
301.
In 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee stated that it
was "essential for the United States to be able to act unilaterally
in any situation where it [was] unable to obtain redress through
219 Final Act, supra note 11, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
220 One U.S. Senator, frustrated with the pace of not only the GATT
dispute resolution mechanism, but also with the entire GATT structure,
dubbed the GATT the "Gentleman's Agreement to Talk and Talk." Holmer
& Bello, Savior or Scourge, supra note 23, at 527.
221 The "dilator strategy" refers to actions taken by a party to delay the
GATT dispute resolution process, such as blocking the formation of a panel,
refusing the adoption of a report, or avoiding compliance with an order from
the panel. See Sykes, The Strategic Design, supra note 84, at 315-16 (describing
delay tactics in the GATT dispute settlement process); see also supra notes 126-
28 and accompanying text.
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the GATT."2 Additionally, the House Committee Report
accompanying the 1988 amendments to section 301 echoed similar
dissatisfaction with GATT, explaining that "[t]he purpose of the
[section 301] amendment is to expedite decisions and actions in
meritorious section 301 cases .... Under present law, cases have
often continued under discussion for years without a final
determination to act or to terminate, particularly when GATT
proceedings are involved."' From 1973 to 1988, the drawbacks
of GATT provided ample explanation and justification for
congressional clamor to adopt tough trade measures to attack the
trade practices of other nations. 4
The WTO dispute resolution process will alleviate precisely
the congressional concerns that prompted the creation and
sharpening of section 301. The Understanding guarantees a party
the right to a panel, permits a timely appeal to the Appellate
Body, assures the adoption of a final ruling, imposes a rigid
timeline for each phase of the dispute process, carefully monitors
compliance with decisions, authorizes retaliation for noncompli-
ance, and provides for binding arbitration should monitoring and
sanctions fail.2 Simply put, with the implementation of the
WTO's legalistic, rule-oriented dispute resolution mechanism, the
United States will be able to obtain redress without the need for
section 301. Therefore, when assessing the legality of unilateral
sanctions under Article 23, the Appellate Body should account for
this historical reality.
6.2.1.2. Undermining the Section 301 Strategy
Not only does the Understanding effectively eliminate the
foundation of section 301, but it also undermines the strategic
value of section 301. Section 301, according to former officials at
the Office of the USTR, "often can be used more effectively when
22 H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1973) (emphasis added).
m H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 70-71 (1987)
(emphasis added).
-4 See Josh Schein, Comment, Section 301 and U.S. Trade Law: The
Limited Impact of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act on American
Obligations Under GAT, PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y J., 105, 129 (1992) (Special
Intramural Issue).
See Understanding, supra note 17, arts. 6, 17, 20, 21, 22, 33 I.L.M. at
123041; discussion supra section 3.3.
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it is not used, but instead credibly threatened." 226  Just as an
inadequate dispute resolution process leads to "the need for
unilateral threat strategies to help enforce existing trade agree-
ments,"M threat strategies would be unnecessary "if trade
agreements afforded cheap, impartial, and expeditious third-party
adjudication backed by the coercive authority to induce compli-
ance with the bargain." 8
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism offers a relatively
cheap, clearly impartial, and reasonably expeditious third-party
adjudication system, thereby obviating the need for threat
strategies like section 301 to enforce trade obligations. 22' Fur-
thermore, "the continued existence of the statutory authority for
unilateral action may in fact become counterproductive, as such
actions may be perceived as facilitating opportunism while serving
no constructive function."2 °  Continued use of aggressively
unilateral trade tactics "is likely to be rejected as bullying, pure
and simple." 1 Indeed, even maintaining section 301 as a mere
option could carry a damaging international perception. z2  In
226 Bello & Holmer, Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 70 (emphasis
added). In other words, S 301 is a threat strategy; it "works through feints and
threats, rather than through formal legal processes." Fisher & Steinhardt, supra
note 30, at 578.
227 Sykes, The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 289.
n 8 Id.
229 Professor Sykes noted prior to the completion of the Uruguay Round
that "if the Uruguay Round does produce an effective procedure for third-party
dispute resolution, the need for unilateral threat strategies to protect U.S.
interests will diminish greatly." Id. at 290.
230 Id. Not only may § 301 use be counterproductive, the statute also may
have relevancy problems, as it targets governmental, not private action. See 19
U.S.C. § 2411(a), (b) (1988). This drawback limits the application of § 301 in
fundamental ways. For example, while many argue that S 301 can break
systematic market barriers in Japan, this argument frequently neglects the fact
that private industry, not the government, constructs and maintains many
Japanese barriers. Therefore, as one scholar notes: "It does little good to
threaten the Japanese government with sanctions if no action by that
government would enable the United States to achieve its objectives." Sykes,
The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 303. That is why in its case against Fuji,
Kodak must go to great lengths to tie the Japanese government into Fuji's
market access limiting scheme. See supra note 174. Without a connection to
government activity, Kodak's claim cannot be brought under § 301. See id.
231 BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 3, at 3.
232 Declaring a unilateral trade war on a trading partner via § 301 "would
once again leave the United States isolated in the world ... [with] Europeans,
Latin Americans, and Asians, fearing similar treatment from us in the future
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the face of the Understanding and U.S. access to a promising
multilateral dispute resolution mechanism, use of section 301, at
least as a threat strategy, is no longer necessary, sensible, or
valid.23
6.2.2. Section 301"s Effect on World Trade and the
WTO
6.2.2.1. Costs to the World Trading System
With a promising multilateral dispute resolution process in
place, the costs of utilizing section 301, in terms of damage to the
world trading system, far outweigh the benefits to the United
States. Implicit in section 301 use is an assumption that "the U.S.
way is the 'fair' way, and that it is up to the rest of the world to
follow suit."1 4  Pursuing protectionist goals25 through the use
of section 301 and challenging the world to follow suit would
produce actual, reputational, and retaliatory costs. The economic
ramifications of these three cost categories outweigh any trade
liberalizing benefits flowing from section 301.
First, in terms of actual costs, any tariff, quota, or sanction
negatively impacts world trade.2 6  Unilateral sanctions impose
.... " 140 CONG. REC. S6324 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Bradley). This "am I next?" complex will logically motivate U.S. trade partners
to rally against the United States.
" The improved WTO dispute resolution procedures, according to two
former USTR officials, "further erode the already circumscribed credibility of
threats of unilateral action by the United States under [§] 301." Judith H. Bello
& Alan F. Holmer, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization
or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795, 800 (1992) [hereinafter Inter-
nationalization of 301]. The best role for S 301 in a world where the WTO
dispute resolution process reigns supreme is as an investigatory tool or, at most,
as "the private sector's insurance policy." Id. For a discussion of how to use
§ 301 in a WTO-consistent manner, see Marc A. Moyer, Comment, Section 301
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: A Formidable Weapon in
the War Against Economic Espionage, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 178, 190 (1994)
(stating that the overall purpose, historical development, and current statutory
language of S 301 make it "a logical choice as a weapon in the fight against
economic espionage").
" Palmeter, supra note 60, at 110.
2" As even its supporters admit, S 301 can be administered in a protection-
ist manner. See Holmer & Bello, Savior or Scourge, supra note 23, at 532.
'3 See Jonathan T. Fried, Squaring the Circle: Unilateralism, Bilateralism and
Multilateralism in US. Trade Policy, 8 B.U. INT'L .J. 231, 236 1990) (discussing
past U.S. trade actions that were unilateral in nature, often resulting in
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a burden on the system of free trade that affects not only the
target, but also the instigator of the retaliation. While the
detrimental effects on the instigator may not be immediate, an
economic backlash in today's interdependent world would surely
follow any impediment to free trade, especially if a significant
trading partner is implicated. 7
Second, retaliation, if perceived as unjustified, carries a
reputational cost.28 Every action in the international arena
either contributes to or detracts from a positive reputation. If the
United States retaliates erratically based on its own subjective
notions of fair play, its reputation as a reliable trading partner and
an economic world leader will falter. Thus, "the mere fear that
[s]ection 301 may be used to renege on the bargain may diminish
the willingness of other countries to negotiate with the United
States," 9 while leaving other nations wondering whether they
are next.24°
"'managed tradeo' to the detriment of comparative advantage, dynamic
efficiency, and consumer welfare"). Not only is there an economic burden
associated with unilateral sanctions, but there is also a burden on global trade
progress as the discussion and debate over unilateral sanctions inevitably takes
center stage, pushing other pressing issues into the background.
237 Imposition of unilateral sanctions, as demonstrated in the recent
automobile dispute, serves as both a punishment to innocent bystanders and as
a windfall to arguably undeserving recipients. Innocent bystanders, such as
owners and employees of Japanese car dealerships, would be severely affected
by the punitive tariffs. See Witnesses Cite Trade Laws, Fairness in Debate Over
Japan Auto Sanctions, [July-Dec.] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 109, at
A-26, A-27 (Gune 7, 1995) (reporting that one owner of a Lexus dealership
"predicted the sanctions wouldforce him to lay off 100 workers immediately").
On the other hand, as an example of an arguably undeserved windfall gain,
consider that stock prices of the Big Three surged after the trade sanctions
against Japanese automobiles were announced. See Bob Davis, U.S. Launches
Trade Offensive Against Japan, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1995, at A2, All ("If the
sanctions are put in place over the next six months, each of [the Big Three]
could make a dollar or two a share over the next five years. .. ").
238 Not only is there a reputational cost to the United States from the
indiscriminate application of discretionary S 301, but there is also a reputational
cost when the United States fails to comply with its own standards. With a
great deal of hypocrisy, the United States frequently denounces foreign
practices as "unreasonable" while, at the same time, regularly engages in these
same "unreasonable" practices. For example, the United States denounced
agricultural trade barriers in Europe while imposing strict quotas on dairy
products, wheat, cotton, peanuts, and sugar at home. See Palmeter, supra note
60, at 110-12.
" Sykes, The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 306.
241 See supra note 233.
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Finally, and most dauntingly, section 301 action may provoke
counterretaliation against the United States. 14' If misguidedly
applied, threats of unilateral retaliation could result in a trade war,
especially if used against other economic superpowers.2 42 Trade
wars wreak havoc on the world trading system, affecting consum-
er prices, credit, and virtually every aspect of the world econo-
my 24 With section 301 in its arsenal, U.S. trade law "contains
the seeds of a major crisis for U.S. and international trade
relations•"244
62.2.2. Costs to the WTO
Unrestrained use of unilateral sanctions could crack the
foundation of the WTO as a pillar of free trade. As discussed
earlier, nations intent on imposing unilateral sanctions will likely
justify unilateral sanctions as targeting issues of a complex nature,
outside the scope of the WTO. According to one scholar, section
301 "encompass[es] virtually any trade practice the USTR wishes
to attack."24 With an ability to disguise aggressive unilateralism
behind the mask of "complex practices," unilateral sanctions will
become commonplace, thus subverting the WTO's authority in
the area of world trade. Combining a flexible section 301 trade
sword with a narrow interpretation of Article 23 will allow
nations to circumvent the Understanding under the mantra of
"complex practice" and will leave the WTO powerless to shape
the future of the global trading system. WTO signatories,
however, did not intend to marginalize the power of the WTO
after eight years of negotiations and relegate it to an entity whose
name sounds prodigious but whose global effect is minuscule.
241 See Sykes, The Strategic Design, supra note 84, at 313.
24 See Bayard, supra note 89, at 331. Even if a full fledged trade war does
not develop, unilateral retaliation against the Japanese "could threaten the
position of the dollar as the international reserve currency. Indeed, Japan is
already talking of switching its reserves out of dollars and into deutschmarks."
141 CONG. REC. S6324 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
243 See Juan P. Morillo, U.S.-Japanese Trade Dispute, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1205, 1212 (1994) (discussing that both the United States and Japan want
to avoid anything approaching a trade war).
244 Fried, supra note 236, at 233; see also 141 CONG. REC. S6324 (daily ed.
May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bradley) ("Currency markets will react badly.
If you think a rate of 80 yen to the dollar is disadvantageous to this country
... imagine a rate of 75 or even 70.").
245 Sykes, The Limited Case, supra note 82, at 306.
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Indeed, the United States, as well as every WTO signatory, "must
be prepared to live with the international trade rules that it
negotiates. ,246
6.3. The Remedy
Because the new dispute settlement process undermines section
301's purpose and strategy and because the potential costs to
world trade and the WTO outweigh section 301's benefits, the
Appellate Body should sustain a challenge to section 301.24
After declaring that section 301 violates the plain language and
intent of the WTO signatories as embodied in Article 23, the
Appellate Body must formulate a remedy.2 48 The range of
potential remedies stretches from mere recommendations 49 to
compensation2'° to the authorization of retaliatory sanctions.21'
For the hypothetically-adjudicated automobile dispute, the
Appellate Body's ruling should address a full range of remedies.
These remedies include a suggestion as to how the United States
can bring section 301 into compliance with the Understanding, a
recommendation that the parties arrange appropriate compensa-
tion, and an authorization of cross-sectorial retaliation if the
parties cannot agree on appropriate compensation.
It is important to note that no decision by the Appellate Body
or any WTO panel has the power to infringe on U.S. sovereign-
246 Bello & Holmer, Internationalization of 301, supra note 233, at 802.
247 Similarly, because "there is less of an argument for aggressive
unilateralism" and because the United States "could face more serious
consequences in the future than it did in the past," Bayard and Elliott
recommend "that the United States move from aggressive unilateralism to
aggressive multilateralism, using the improved dispute settlement mechanism to
enforce the WTO rules." BAYARD & ELLOTT, supra note 3, at 3.
248 See Understanding, supra note 16, art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1237.
249 Upon finding a violation of a covered agreement, the Appellate Body
"shall recommend that the member concerned bring the measure into
conformity with that agreement." See id.
211"The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate
withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary measure. ..
Id. art. 3(7), at 1227.
251 "The last resort which this Understanding provides to the Member
invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of suspending the
application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements
on a discriminatory basis.. .. " Id.
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tyas2 or change its domestic law. 3  That power lies solely
with the nation's domestic institution responsible for creating the
law in the first place - the Congress, the President, the courts, or
the administrative agencies charged with regulation. 2 4  The
Appellate Body may only "recommend that the [violating]
country begin observing its obligations.... It is then up to the
disputing countries to decide how they will settle their differenc-
.2 The WTO's inability to encroach upon the sovereignty of the United
States pervaded the congressional committee and floor debates over the
Uruguay Round Agreements' implementing legislation. As one Senator stated:
[s]imply put, the World Trade Organization cannot change U.S. law.
A U.S. law can only be changed if the U.S. Congress votes to
change the law. A final safeguard to U.S. sovereignty is that if at any
time the United States becomes dissatisfied, it can withdraw from the
[WTO] after giving 6 months' notice. That is a pretty good escape
hatch. In the event the WTO becomes arbitrary or capricious, we get
out.
140 CONG. REC. S15,275 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
In light of this concern for sovereignty, the Clinton Administration promised
to introduce legislation which would establish a comprehensive WTO review
process. See 140 CONG. REC. S15,341 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994) (a letter from
STR Kantor to Senator Robert Dole stating that the Clinton Administration
would support legislation to establish a WTO Dispute Settlement Review
Commission to review final reports adverse to the United States).
" The President's Statement of Administrative Action emphasizes the
sovereignty of U.S. law in declaring that "the new WTO dispute settlement
system does not give panels any power to order the United States ... to
change [its] laws." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1008.
Further, the WTO implementing legislation states that "[n]o provision of any
of the Uruguay Round Agreements... that is inconsistent with any law of the
United States shall have effect." Uruguay Round Agreements Act S 102(a)(1),
108 Stat. at 4815. The implementing legislation also states that "[n]othing in
this Act shall be construed ... to limit any authority conferred under any
[trade] law of the United States, including section 301 .. . ." Id. S 102(a)(2)(B).
"' The Statement of Administrative Action states that
[r]eports issued by panels or the Appellate Body under the Under-
standing have no binding effect under the law of the United States.
... If a report recommends that the United States change federal law
to bring it into conformity with a Uruguay Round agreement, it is for
the Congress to decide whether any such change will be made.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1032. "[T]he Understanding
leaves to the discretion of the United States any change in federal or state law
and the manner in which any such change may be implemented - whether
through the adoption of legislation, a change in regulation, judicial action, or
otherwise." Id. at 1032-33.
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Although the Appellate Body cannot infringe upon national
sovereignty, nor alter the language, implementation, or interpreta-
tion of domestic law, it is by no means powerless. The Appellate
Body may declare a domestic law to be in conflict with the WTO,
recommend how the violating nation might resolve the conflict,
suggest how the parties might structure an appropriate compensa-
tion arrangement if damages have resulted, and, most dramatically,
authorize the imposition of retaliatory sanctions by the harmed
nation upon the trade violator. 6 Thus, although the WTO
does not have the ability to force domestic legal change, its ability
to pressure a violator to adjust its ways by threat of WTO-autho-
rized sanctionsS 7 and international condemnation denotes
significant power. In sum, while nothing in the creation of the
Understanding prohibits the use of section 301, "[t]he United
States [or any other violator] would simply be more likely to be
required to pay for doing so." 5'
6.3.1. The Suggestion for Compliance
As stated in the Understanding:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a
measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure
into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may
suggest ways in which the Member concerned could
'-s Id. at 1008. Thus, despite the establishment and celebration of a legalist
dispute settlement procedure, much of the ultimate dispute solution depends on
good old-fashioned bargaining power politics. Although the Uruguay Round
produced a dispute settlement procedure that channels disputes along certain
legalist avenues, this procedure cannot change a world where economic power-
houses, if they so choose, can threaten and browbeat trading partners into
submission.
256 See id. at 1015-16.
257 With regard to the power of the WTO, one commentator stated that
the "WTO could force Congress into making a cruel choice: either alter or
repeal a law determined to be WTO-illegal or face perpetual trade sanctions
against any U.S. industry the winning country chooses." See 140 CONG. REC.
S15,143 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (a letter from Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach
to USTR Mickey Kantor).
28 Patterson & Patterson, supra note 17, at 53.
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implement the recommendations. 2"
The Appellate Body is not required to suggest ways in which the
United States can bring section 301 into con-
formity with Article 23. The goal of dispute resolution, however,
"is to secure a positive solution [that is] mutually acceptable to the
parties ... .,,2' Accordingly, in the automobile dispute, the
Appellate Body would have made these suggestions, affirmatively
stating how section 301 can be implemented in a manner consis-
tent with the Understanding.
The language of section 301 is not in direct conflict with
Article 23, or any other provision of the Understanding for that
matter, because when the USTR initiates a section 301 investiga-
tion in a case involving a WTO trade agreement, section 303(a)(2)
requires the USTR to follow the WTO dispute resolution
process. 261 Therefore, an Appellate Body's recommendation on
how the United States could utilize section 301 in a manner
consistent with the Understanding is simple: follow your own
rules. If the United States abides by the letter of section 301, it
will not threaten unilateral sanctions, but rather will route all
grievances regarding a trade agreement through the WTO's
dispute resolution mechanism.262
"s Understanding, supra note 16, art. 19(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1237 (citations
omitted).
260 Id. art. 3(7), 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
261 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17, at 1018.
262 In analyzing the effect of the Understanding upon S 301, some
commentators conclude that the Understanding "complements" or "internation-
alizes" S 301. In other words, "by providing dramatically more effective
international enforcement against unfair traders," the Understanding will deter
GATT offenses, or "at least restore[] a reasonable balance of rights and obliga-
tions." Bello & Holmer, Internationalization of 301, supra note 233, at 799.
Under the "internationalization of 301" theory, S 301 is consistent with the
Understanding. Indeed, § 301 stands side-by-side with the Understanding "as
the complement in U.S. domestic law to international legal action in the
GATT under the dispute settlement procedures." Id. at 800. If the Under-
standing and S 301 complement each other in a coterminous manner, then
S 301 should never be used prematurely and, thus, will never run afoul of the
WTO. See Jean H. Grier, Section 301 and Its Future Use with the Uruguay
Round Agreements, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1994 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 863, 1994) available in WESTLAW, PLI Database (stating
that the Understanding "complements section 301" and "internationalizes
section 301").
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A problem arises when the United States attempts to under-
mine Article 23 via the "four corners" jurisdictional defense or the
"add to or diminish" affirmative defense.263  Therefore, in
addition to demanding that the United States follow its own rules,
the Appellate Body must reaffirm a broad interpretation of its
jurisdictional grant under Article 23. According to its plain
meaning and the intent of the signatories, Article 23 forecloses
unilateral action.2 64 Aside from the plain language of the Article
and the intent of the signatories, the historical undermining of
section 301's purpose and strategy; as well as the need for a policy
in the best interests of world trade and the WTO, support a
ruling that premature use of section 301 violates Article 23.
The United States hypothetically may also present a "mixed
motive" case, where some U.S. justification for section 301 falls
arguably outside the WTO. In such a scenario, the WTO should
construe strictly the allegations and find that if one U.S. com-
plaint involves a WTO covered agreement, even incidentally, then
the Appellate Body should rule that Article 23 will govern. The
United States thereby would bind itself to the WTO dispute
resolution requirements in such cases.
The problem with section 301, therefore, is not its language,
drafting, or procedural dictates, but rather the way the United
States utilizes it. In order to conform with Article 23 and the
entire Understanding, section 301 need not be amended in any
way. The United States simply must construe Article 23 accord-
ing to its plain meaning, the intent of the signatories, and in light
of policy considerations which are in the best interest of world
trade. Utilizing section 301 in strict accordance with Article 23
and the WTO dispute resolution procedures does not require
further amendment, only sound application.
6.3.2. Compensation and Retaliation: The Issue of
Damages
In the hypothetical automobile dispute ruling, after suggesting
how to utilize section 301 in a manner consistent with the
Understanding, the Appellate Body must address the issue of
263 See discussion supra section 5.2.1 for an explanation of the "four
corners" jurisdictional defense. See discussion supra section 5.2.3 for an
explanation of the "add to or diminish" affirmative defense.
264 See discussion supra section 5.1.2.
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/9
ADJUDICATING SECTION 301
damages.2 65  As seen in the automobile dispute, section 301
sanctions could produce billions of dollars in-potential damag-
es. 66 With such high stakes, no Appellate Body ruling on a
section 301 challenge can ignore the damages issue.
In its opinion, the Appellate Body should order appropriate
compensation to the damaged party.26 If the parties cannot
agree upon proper compensation, the Appellate Body should
authorize cross-sectoral retaliation in proportion to the damages
incurred. This retaliation should automatically follow a failure to
satisfactorily compensate the damaged party within a strict, but
reasonable amount of time. The Appellate Body should provide
great latitude to the damaged party when determining how to
maximize the effect of retaliation, leaving the damaged nation
with the right to retaliate across economic sectors.268  The only
limit on retaliation should be proportionality.
7. CONCLUSION
The GATT, the WTO, and world trade have successfully
navigated the transition to an indisputably interdependent world.
In this globalized world, our hopes of achieving maximum
economic growth and prosperity rest with the pursuit of noble
ideals - cooperation, mutual trust, and openness. When trade
arguments surface, nations must make a fundamental choice either
to solve these disputes unilaterally through self-help remedies or
to solve them multilaterally through a neutral, third party forum.
Before the historic and monumental Uruguay Round accords,
26' This analysis assumes that damages have accumulated since the United
States imposed S 301.
266 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
267 Damages would be aimed at making the Japanese whole. With this goal
in mind, damages would "consist only of profits lost from cars that the
Japanese could not sell elsewhere in the period between" when the sanctions
take effect and when the WTO adopts a final Appellate Body decision. G.
Richard Shell, Kantor's "Sue Me"Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1995, at A27.
A detailed discussion of damages is outside the scope of this Comment.
26 The notion of targeting across economic sectors is designed to maximize
the retaliatory effect. Thus, if the dispute occurs over trade in goods, the
retaliating nation could not only retaliate in the specific area of goods, but also
in the areas of intellectual property, financial services, or agriculture. As USTR
Kantor stated: "Initially you are confined to the sector [of-the dispute],. . . but
then you can cross retaliate," especially "if there was not enough trade in the
sector to cover whatever the supposed damages were." Senate Commerce
Hearing, supra note 163, at 31.
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there was no real choice in dispute resolution; the GATT was
ineffective and the internationally dreaded section 301 followed.
In a truly remarkable display of international cooperation,
however, trade liberalization triumphed over protectionism in the
Uruguay Round Agreements. The establishment of the WTO and
its legalist, rule-oriented dispute resolution process embodied the
signatories' hopes for multilateral dispute resolution.
These are formidable times for the WTO and the world
trading system, for the post-Uruguay Round world is shifting and
unsettled. At the first available opportunity, the Appellate Body
of the WTO should reinforce the multilateral trading system by
ruling that any nation which imposes unilateral sanctions will
violate Article 23 of the Understanding. The Appellate Body
should interpret the Understanding according to the plain
meaning and intent of the signatories as enlightened by a policy
rationale emphasizing the best interests of world trade. Pursuant
to such an analysis, the Appellate Body would have sustained the
Japanese challenge to section 301 sanctions in the automobile
dispute under Article 23, despite the United States' "four corners"
and "add to or diminish" defenses. As a remedy, the Appellate
Body could have suggested appropriate compensation to the
Japanese and authorized Japanese cross-sectoral retaliation against
the United States.
Such a bold ruling by the Appellate Body would make a
powerful statement by openly declaring that in today's interdepen-
dent world it is the province of the WTO to interpret the
Uruguay Round Agreements, by declaring what the law is, and by
holding the signatories to their voluntary commitments. While
such a courageous opinion would entail some loss of national
sovereignty, the economic benefits of higher living standards,
increased employment, and efficient trade far outweigh the costs
to sovereignty.
In a world where the sphere of international law is constantly
growing as the sphere of domestic law is continuously shrinking,
it might be the destiny of the Appellate Body to become the
"John Marshall of international law" and elevate the authority of
the whole international system over the power of one sovereign
actor. Until the WTO rules as such, unilateral action will
continue to arise, frustrating efforts to maximize the standard of
living for all citizens of the world.
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